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ABSTRACT 
This paper is a case study of the German Navy. The analysis centers on the role of naval 
institutions within state and society, the interplay between naval strategy and statecraft, 
and the factors affecting civil-military relations. The progression from first a young 
empire driven by Weltpolitik and navalism, to ultimately a compact and multilaterally 
focused naval institution operating within alliance collective security systems, 
demonstrates the limits and potentials of naval strategy under widely disparate statecraft. 
Unlike the long-established maritime democracies, such as Britain, France, or the United 
States, Germany’s naval experience is rife with discontinuities and in many ways can be 
viewed as infant in its contemporary form. 
To the professional naval officer serving in a democracy, the failures and 
successes of the various iterations of the German Navy provide myriad universal, 
timeless lessons that can be applied toward the effective conduct of ones duties. More 
than a handy reference of narrowly focused operational naval tales, this paper offers the 
aspiring naval officer an understanding of the imponderable aspects of navies: The 
importance of melding strategic purpose with long-range construction planning, the role 
of tradition in fostering a healthy naval cadre, and the importance of respecting 
geostrategic and economic realities. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The story of the German Navy from the 19th century until the present illustrates 
the limitations and potential of maritime strategy as a feature of national and alliance 
strategy. In such maritime democracies as the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States, the tendency exists to focus solely on the national record of naval strategy to the 
exclusion of other examples of strategy other than the formation of legend and myth in a 
manner unhelpful to any real understanding of the nature of strategy and the purpose of 
navies as an expression of national power. This thesis takes the record of the German 
Navy more seriously than its many colorful legends or as a handy source of interesting 
tales of war at sea. In fact, the strategic order of the present is hard to conceive without 
the role that Germany’s navy played in the 20th century with two failed bids for world 
power, for which reason alone a young naval officer interested in the higher aspects of 
war and power should concern him or herself with this important story.  
Less well known as an example of strategy, but significant all the same, is the 
extension of this story after 1945 in the two Germanys and into the united Germany and 
its navy since 1990. In this connection, the navies of the world all have taken on different 
roles germane to the political character, size and geography of the given nation state and 
the international context within which said navy operates. What is the validity of Admiral 
Alfred T. Mahan’s statement in his seminal late 19th century epoch of imperialism that 
“the history of the seaboard nations has been less determined by the shrewdness and 
foresight of governments than by conditions of position, extent, configuration, number, 
and character of their people.”?1 This statement was to flatter both the British and the 
American reader of the late 19th century, but it was a statement that was as much read in 
Imperial Germany by those in a rising tide of national energy who aspired to world 
power. The impact of this idea was calamitous, but the German attempt at naval power 
was central, in the end, to Germany finally finding an appropriate role for itself as middle 
                                                
1 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1918), 28.  
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naval power within the framework of more coherent statecraft, a fact that bears repeating 
in a new age of imperialism and its strategic confusion in the present. This study seeks to 
find this link between statecraft, national policy and naval strategy in the case of a non-
Anglo-Saxon continental power with world standing. An analysis of such phenomena has 
great merit for young naval officers who seek to understand the high aspects of their 
service and its place in the arena of national and international policy and strategy.  
Throughout the past century and a half, the German Navy as the servant of 
empires and republics has struggled to find a role appropriate to the geographical, 
political, and economic realities that characterized each phase of German nationhood in 
modern times. From a quest to become a great world power under the leadership of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II in the epoch after 1888, to the ambition of dominating Europe under 
Hitler in 1939, and ultimately, a preference for first the divided Germany’s role as 
imbedded in international alliances through a multilateral framework and later its role as 
a united nation, the German Navy at first evolved through many failed strategy-policy 
configurations along its journey to the present. This thesis seeks to find the common 
themes of policy and strategy, as well as the imponderable features at the heart of navies 
that move across these epochs in an effort to understand the making of naval strategy and 
the character of naval institutions within the German nation state and its expression of 
policy in both international and domestic terms. The thesis also highlights how, despite 
the appearance of continuity in certain aspects, discontinuities of various kinds have 
eventuated and what these latter things say to the general topic.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The German nation today has regained a position of power in Europe whereby the 
record of total war in the past figures more in a negative sense to contemporary national 
goals and the popular mind than does the memory of heroism at sea and feats of combat 
derring-do. Yet, Germany has a rich naval history and its navy is a prominent feature of 
the armed forces, if not on the scale as in the maritime democracies. Imbued with a 
skepticism about the costs of war and a conception of national interest more or less on a 
continental scale, the domestic landscape in Germany does not support an expansion of 
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the present-day German Navy on the level of ambition of, say, the French and British 
navies with their more intact imperial legacies and blue water ethos.  
One does ill to stumble—from an American perspective—too greatly over 
present-day German civil military relations, which do or do not conform to U.S. civil 
military relations, with its rather loud celebration of martial virtues by un-martial persons. 
The Bundesmarine of the present has established itself as a feature of the Bundeswehr, to 
be sure, in the shadow of the German Army, but the naval service is central to the life of 
the forces, and its role in counter-terror and counter-piracy operations garners above 
average note if not some skepticism. Despite contemporary public doubts about the moral 
waste of war and its political futility, generally, and a neuralgia about any pathos-laden 
summoning in public life of Hitler’s Navy in battle, the Bundeswehr is presently in a 
process of reconfiguration and reorganization with great importance for the peace and 
security of Europe and German civil military relations and the formation of strategy and 
policy in the alliance.  
The role of the navy in the past bulks heavily into the formation of policy, the 
strength of the forces, and civil military relations as pertains to how sailors see 
themselves in German society. The common view in Germany is that a solid 
understanding of the failures of strategy, policy, and civilian interaction apropos the navy 
is of utmost importance as the Bundesmarine looks toward a future that can be unmarred 
by the past. The young officer learns that the extraction of narrow, naval operationally 
bound lessons from the record of war is a dead end. The making of wise policy decisions 
that support the long-term health of the German state and of Europe as a whole imposes 
the need for a broader view of policy and strategy, which has led to a profoundly 
different approach than operated in the epoch from 1880 until 1945.  
With the creation of the Bundesmarine in 1955, Germany for the first time 
adopted a naval policy appropriate to the geographic and economic realities of the state—
maintaining an appropriately medium-size force with an overall strategic aim of being a 
strong alliance partner. The modern German Navy has resulted from an evolution of the 
Bundesmarine, but now German policy makers have acknowledged a need for reform in 
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order to structure a navy that is postured to defend against global threats within the 
context both of alliance operations and German security interests.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The German Navy’s relationship with its past throughout its various phases have 
demonstrated how this view of the past has changed with the different political and 
strategic order in Germany, a process from navalism and world power ambitions in the 
19th and 20th centuries and, in the Federal Republic and the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), the manner in which German civil military relations are often polarized 
over the role of the navy in both the domestic political excesses of the imperial and 
Weimar epoch, to say nothing of the role of the Navy in the Wehrmacht in national 
socialism.  
One must make a distinction between security policy, naval strategy and the role 
of the navy generally in the armed forces, and how sailors look at the past as they see 
themselves. The German past is fraught with challenges, as well as examples of naval 
virtues, and the selection of these issues has long been problematic in a way that outsiders 
can only poorly understand. In the German Navy, this issue hinges on what is meant with 
the term tradition—that is, a usable past for the professional extracted from a history that 
often offers little that is of much use. The German experience is unique in that the 
Bundesmarine (as a part of the Bundeswehr) has had to construct its tradition from 
selected episodes in the past while eschewing national socialism and the worst excesses 
of the Kriegsmarine—while maintaining the tradition of command and obedience that 
goes back to Prussian days, but altering it to fit within a democracy. An American scholar 
who has analyzed the issue notes “[m]aintenance of military tradition as practiced in the 
Reichswehr and Wehrmacht, that is to say, as a means of preserving the exclusive 
position of the military in the state through the use of symbols and ceremonies drawn 
from the past, and as a method of operational and political education for soldiers, played 
a minor role in the planning that took place during the period from 1950 to 1955,”2 but 
                                                
2 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 48. 
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this minor role was found to hinder the construction of a cohesive military, and ultimately 
gave way to a reconnection of sorts with the past. This all begs the question of how does 
a naval institution go about building new roles and missions, as well as laying a 
foundation of naval professionalism, as Germany did with its concept of tradition from 
the wreckage in 1945–1955. That is, how did sailors re-forge their connection with state 
and society, and how did the German Navy transform itself from an exclusive “state 
within a state” system as was manifest in the Weimar and Nazi eras, into one centered 
around the “citizen in uniform” as is found in Germany today?  
Part and parcel to understanding the ways in which the German Navy rebuilt itself 
in state and society is the reform of command, obedience, leadership and democratic 
integration manifest in the practice and ideal of Innere Führung.3 Without equal term in 
the English language, the German air force officer and NPS graduate Michael Lux 
explains it “means that the soldier in democracy—the citizen in uniform—must not serve 
or defend any regime, ruler, or ideology with unconditional obedience against the best of 
one’s knowledge.”4 This concept served as the guiding light during the early years of a 
West German military in the wake of Nazism, and it created an ethos amongst the naval 
professionals that could be both be functional and exist within the bounds of a military 
serving in a democracy. Innere Führung recognizes that the cultivation of tradition 
“promotes the intellectual and political maturity of soldiers and the integration of the 
Bundeswehr into state and society.”5 Thomas Berger argues that for Germany, “the 
armed forces are trustworthy only if they are integrated into civilian society,” as well as 
the executive branch of government with its checks and balances,6 which has resulted in 
a conflict between those who view tradition as essential to fostering a functional 
                                                
3 Innere Führung, as defined in the January 2008 Dienstvorschrift 10/1, is “the guiding principle of the 
‘citizen in uniform,’ and ‘ensures that Bundeswehr soldiers are part of society.’ The term cannot be 
translated literally as “internal command,” as such a term in English has no counterpart in U.S. military 
usage.  
4 Michael G. Lux, “Innere Fuehrung—A Superior Concept of Leadership” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2008), 1. 
5 Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, Innere Führung (Leadership, Development and Civic 
Education), Bonn, January 28, 2008, annex 3/3. 
6 Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 195. 
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professional military and those who fear its role in a resurgence of German militarism, 
imperialism and nationalism. In this thesis, I argue that the reconstruction of tradition and 
the cultivation of military professionalism within the Bundesmarine has been vital to the 
healing of German civil-military relations, and I will demonstrate the ways in which the 
contemporary German Navy has drawn from the past to foster a professional alliance-
based force that is disassociated with the unfavorable aspects of its history. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A useful framework for the major themes in German naval history comes from 
the prominent German naval historian—and retired head of the Bundeswehr history 
office and German Navy captain—Dr. Werner Rahn. At the 1990 Mahan Centennial 
Conference, Rahn presented his “Twelve Theses on the Development of the German Navy 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries.7 Rahn’s theses span the gap between the early German 
Navy and its role as a symbol of national unity during the unification of the German 
states, to an instrument of alliance strategy as manifest in its modern form. These ideas 
have great utility for the purpose of this study and are further undergirded by the work of 
a U.S. historian of the cold war epoch, Keith M. Bird’s German Naval History: A Guide 
to the Literature. His work serves as a bibliographic guide to fill in the details along the 
trajectory from the imperial Kaiserliche Marine to the post-war navies of West Germany 
(the Bundesmarine) and East Germany (the Volksmarine). An exploration of the process 
of German reunification following the fall of the Berlin wall, and the reinforcement of a 
strategy centered around promoting Germany as a responsible alliance partner as the two 
separate naval organizations were merged into one, will rely on contemporary sources, 
such as the late Ronald D. Asmus’s, Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence 
and International Reticence, and the various German White Papers published by the 
ministry of defense. 
                                                
7 Werner Rahn, 140 Years of German Navies: Their Defeat and Re-Birth—from Confrontation to Co-
operation; Twelve Theses on the Development of the German Navy in the 19th and 20th Centuries 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1990). This work is the final essay in the collection of essay’s edited by 
Rahn titled Deutsche Marinen im Wandel: vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument internationaler 
Sicherheit (The German navy from its beginning as a symbol of national unity to its role as an instrument 
of international security). 
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Rahn’s second thesis deals with the origins of the German Navy not only as an 
answer to a Danish blockade, but as a symbol of unity that the Frankfurt parliament used 
as a political tool in unifying the German states. A brief foray into the early beginnings of 
the German Navy is useful as a scene-setter, but the story of the German Navy truly starts 
after 1871, with article 53 of the constitution granting the German navy imperial status 
and bestowing it with the name Kaiserliche Marine.8 In his first thesis, Rahn discusses 
the prominence of Mahan’s sea power theories in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, and the evolution of the navy for use “as a military instrument in order to be able 
to assert her position in relation to other great powers.”9 Kaiser Wilhelm II was an ardent 
disciple of Mahan, and, together with his Chief of Navy Admiral Alfred Von Tirpitz, he 
ultimately conceived of a High Seas Fleet that could be used as a tool of his aggressive 
foreign policy weltpolitik (world policy). Lawrence Sondhaus’s Preparing for Weltpolitik 
provides context to the early social and strategic dilemmas facing the imperial navy. A 
deeper exploration of the economic and domestic political strains imposed by the 
construction of the Kaiser’s High Seas Fleet will be facilitated by Gary Weir’s Building 
the Kaiser’s Navy and Holger H. Herwig’s “Luxury” Fleet.  
The Kaiserlichemarine ultimately focused on a Mahanian strategy of building a 
battleship fleet, engaging in an economically damaging naval arms race with Great 
Britain perpetuated by the unveiling of the Grand Fleet’s first dreadnaught class 
battleship in 1905. Rahn’s third thesis alludes to the dangers associated with Germany’s 
aforementioned naval trajectory in the early twentieth century, concluding “any power 
policy which included a claim to rule the seas interfered with Great Britain, was bound to 
encounter deep mistrust on the part of this strategically-minded sea power, a mistrust 
which could quickly turn out to be a deadly danger to the Reich.”10  
Prior to this bid to become a great maritime power, the German admiralty spent 
some time in the late nineteenth century under the influence of the newly developed 
                                                
8 Lawrence Sondhaus, Preparing for Weltpolitik: German Sea Power Before the Tirpitz Era 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 101. 
9 Rahn, 140 Years of German Navies, 1. 
10 Ibid., 2. 
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Jeune École (young school)—a camp espoused by French Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-
Theophile Aube—which focused on cruiser warfare and guerre de course rather than sea 
control and the maintenance of large battleship fleets.11 The Jeune École was 
diametrically opposed to Mahan’s theory of how a navy should be structured and 
employed, and it came at a time when the maritime democracies were all amenable to 
adopting new naval policies. Such debates were not merely theoretical, but required 
completely different approaches to fleet construction. Technological advancements were 
outpacing construction timelines, which, taken together with uncertainty of the overall 
direction the fleet should take, fed into Wilhelm II’s less favorable traits, which Alfred 
von Tirpitz outlines as “his swift comprehension, his imagination, which was easily 
distracted by individual impressions, and his self-consciousness,” resulting in “the danger 
that irresponsible influences would release impulses which would either be impossible to 
carry out or would not be in harmony with the whole course of action.”12 Tirpitz was 
highly influential in the focusing of the Kaiser’s naval ambitions, the extent to which will 
be researched through Tirpitz’s seminal work My Memoirs. Rahn’s fourth thesis touches 
on the inability of the Reich’s military-industrial complex to keep pace with the Kaiser’s 
ambitious fleet design in the years leading up to World War I while still meeting the 
requirements of maintaining Europe’s largest army.13  
The failures of German naval strategy and policy were strikingly evident at the 
outbreak of war in 1914. Per Tirpitz’s series of naval laws that went into effect between 
1898 and 1912, the fleet would not be ready until 1928, which by itself posed major 
problems to the Reich when it unwillingly went to war in 1914. Beyond inadequate 
material readiness, Ivo Nikolai Lambi summarizes the foundational problems as such: 
lack of inter-agency coordination by the Reichstag; the Kaiser’s direct involvement in 
minute details of naval matters that should have been reserved for the chancellor and the 
naval office; relative youth of the navy as a military institution; and an unclear concept of 
                                                
11 Sondhaus, Preparing for Weltpolitik, 159. 
12 Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, Vol. 1 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1919), 201–202. 
13 Rahn, 140 Years of German Navies, 2. 
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naval strategy.14 Lambi’s work supports Rahn’s fifth thesis, which is that at the outbreak 
of World War I, “the German Naval Command’s political and strategic concept did not 
work.”15 Dan Van der Vat provides a chronicle of the naval follies during the war, 
culminating in the scuttling of the High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow in 1918, an event that 
represented “the embodiment of one of the greatest geo-political and strategic errors in 
history and the product of an obsession sustained for two decades in defiance of 
reality.”16 
During the Weimar period, the German Navy took on the name Reichsmarine. 
This period was characterized by the limitations placed on the armed forces of the 
German republic as dictated by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Rahn, in his sixth thesis, 
addresses the conflict between the Naval High Command and the unfamiliar republican 
form of government, going on in his seventh thesis to conclude that “the German naval 
leadership did not reconcile itself to the Treaty of Versailles.”17 Two interesting 
phenomena resulted from the limitations placed on the Reichsmarine by the Treaty of 
Versailles. On the one hand, Timothy Mulligan points out the sea service became 
“rigorously selective in recruitment,”18 due to the manpower cap of 15,000 officers and 
enlisted imposed by the treaty.19 Not only was the navy highly selective, but Bird argues 
the navy also went about rewriting its history to “create a tradition that would support its 
aspirations.”20 These two factors served to isolate the naval professionals from the 
Weimar society and government. An in-depth analysis of the Weimar naval period will 
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be facilitated by Douglas Carl Peifer’s 1991 thesis, “Evolution of a Naval Strategy: The 
Lessons of the First World War and their Incorporation in German Naval Planning 1924–
1939.” 
Public support of the navy was initially very low after the war, and only through 
great propaganda campaigns undertaken by Tirpitz was this turned around. Building 
public support for the navy relied on a distorted historiography that espoused the 
greatness of Germany’s brief foray as a blue water navy, and a disassociation with the 
navy as a symbol of national unity, as Bird proposes “the attempt to link the 
Reichsmarine of 1919–1933 with its revolutionary ancestor’s colors of black, red, and 
gold was vigorously fought by the navy.”21 The development of German naval strategy in 
the interwar years was driven then not only by the material limitations imposed by the 
Treaty of Versailles, but by the myth of the great German blue water navy. Rather than 
breaking from the past and developing a naval strategy that was a good fit for the German 
state, the Reichsmarine went about a naval construction program that supported past 
conceptions of German naval power. The Reichsmarine attributed its failures in World 
War I to the revolutions and mutinies of 1918 and to bad statecraft rather than to the 
realities of British sea power that decimated the inferior German Navy.  
The Versailles Treaty limited German warships to a maximum displacement of 
10,000 tons.22 Rather than build up a fleet of smaller coastal defense cruisers, Germany 
continued its ambition to be a seafaring nation by building panzerschiffe class armored 
battleships that weighed in at exactly at 10,000 tons. These “pocket battleships,” a name 
bestowed by the British, served no true strategic purpose other than fulfilling the myth of 
Germany as a great sea power—constrained nonetheless by treaty limitations. Germany, 
it seems, had not yet accepted geographic realities, and the Reichsmarine could not afford 
to abandon the myth that Tirpitz constructed, because as Peifer argues, “in the immediate 
post-war years, the key concern of the German navy was survival.”23 
                                                
21 Bird, German Naval History, 219. 
22 Brigham Young University, “Treaty of Versailles,” article 190. 
23 Douglas C. Peifer, “Evolution of a Naval Strategy: The Lessons of the First World War and Their 
Incorporation in German Naval Planning 1924–1939” (master’s thesis, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, 1991), 25. 
 11 
An analysis of the Kriegsmarine, the German Navy during the period of National 
Socialist rule from 1933 through 1945, will be facilitated by the multi-volume work 
Germany and the Second World War. Major currents during this phase of the German 
naval experience were the mismatch between Hitler’s bid for world domination and the 
material readiness of his fleet, Hitler’s hesitance to become entangled in a naval war with 
Great Britain, and continued misunderstanding of the limited naval possibilities for a 
continentally aligned state. In his eighth thesis, Rahn argues, “When the war came, the 
Navy was totally unprepared for it.”24 Hitler, initially, was not a proponent of a large 
naval construction program. He was “quite prepared to accept only a ‘coastal navy’ in 
order to achieve an understanding with Great Britain.”25 The major theme of Hitler’s 
naval ambitions in the decade leading to World War II was this refusal to provoke Great 
Britain, which stood in opposition to Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine Grand 
Admiral Raeder’s Z-plan (a massive fleet construction project, which included two 
aircraft carriers) and strategic ideas for how the Kriegsmarine should be employed. A 
deeper understanding of the Hitler-Raeder relationship will be drawn from Raeder’s 
autobiography My Life, which will be a pivotal exploration in understanding the 
evolution of Hitler’s naval aspirations throughout the Kriegsmarine period. 
Despite Hitler’s desires for England to remain neutral, England declared war on 
Germany in response to his invasion of Poland. The German fleet was nowhere near 
completion at that point, and it was certainly no match for the British fleet. The Reich 
realized that the only way to counter England was to disrupt its seaborne supply lines, 
which is how Admiral Karl Dönitz and his U-boat force came into prominence. In a 1945 
essay, Dönitz posed “only the U-boat could be considered [in disrupting English 
commerce], as only this could penetrate into the main areas of English sea 
communications in spite of English sea supremacy on the surface.”26 Rahn’s ninth thesis 
argues the Kriegsmarine’s reliance on U-boat Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) 
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disruption failed by 1943, due to advancements in allied surveillance and anti-submarine 
weaponry.27 A deeper analysis of Germany’s failures at the close of the war will be 
facilitated by Germany and the Second World War and Bennett and Bennett’s Hitler’s 
Admirals. 
The German state was disarmed in the direct aftermath of the war, and the navy 
was dismantled. Naval activity was limited to minesweeping, policing, and enforcing 
customs regulations—activities that were administered by the occupation governments. It 
was not until 1955–56 that the governments of both the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) and the GDR began building indigenous naval forces. The Bundesmarine and the 
Volksmarine were both staffed by former officers of the Kriegsmarine, but both 
organizations identified with German naval history in different ways and developed 
strategies reflective of the disparate policies of the two states as dictated by their 
alignment with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the West and the Warsaw 
Pact in the East. Peifer argues “the Kriegsmarine proved controversial in post-World War 
II Germany because it had combined admirable characteristics with objectionable 
traits,”28 and Bird adds that “the navy’s leaders found themselves from the beginning 
faced with the problem of selecting the appropriate traditions and military virtues from its 
past.”29 It was during this period, Rahn argues in his eleventh thesis, that the 
Bundesmarine “was obliged merely to perform that function which a German Navy can 
actually perform.”30 That is to say, as a feature of alliance strategy, rather than as an 
unrealistic tool of power politics. 
Thomas Berger argues that the persistent fear of remilitarization and 
renationalization among German society makes Germany’s “continued preference for 
diplomacy and engagement over military power and confrontation understandable.”31 He 
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poses that the German military has before it the task of not only repairing the relationship 
between itself and the civilian population, but getting society to accept a military that 
develops a culture based on history and tradition for the sake of cohesion. The 
Bunderswehr has been in a process of reform since the end of the Cold War, transforming 
itself from an instrument of repelling the threat of the Soviet Union to an expeditionary 
force capable of participating in multilateral military engagements commensurate to the 
size and capabilities of the German state. Thomas Durell Young reasons Germany has 
had more trouble than other European nations in reforming its military forces because of 
its unique history.32 Supporting German national interests beyond the homeland—in 
other words, using the military as an extension of foreign policy—is still very 
controversial.  
The 2006 White Paper lists national and collective defense as the central tasks of 
the Bundeswehr, and that per Article 24(2) of the Basic Law, “German Armed Forces 
may, in addition to national and Alliance defense, be deployed on international operation 
in the context of, and according to the rules of mutual collective security systems.”33 The 
German Navy has evolved from an escort force into a capable expeditionary force that is 
postured to act globally to support NATO and other alliance initiatives. This evolution 
has occurred often times against the grain of public opinion, because within the German 
public a certain skepticism still exists regarding an expansion of German military 
capability beyond direct national defense. The important task for the German government 
thus is to fully repair the relationship between the citizens and the military in order to 
assure future funding appropriate to the strategic goals of the expanded German Navy 
and its responsibility as an equal partner in alliance frameworks capable of responding to 
transnational threats, such as terrorism and piracy. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The research for this thesis will entail a historical study of the German Navy, 
following a methodology along the lines of Militärgeschichte, which calls for “an 
examination of the history of the armed forces within the state as a social and political 
institution, as well as its development and accomplishments in war and peace.”34 Specific 
lessons will be drawn from each period in question, and the common themes that span the 
history of the German naval experience will be analyzed—specifically as those themes 
apply to the contemporary German Navy. A plethora of historical sources exist for the 
Kaiserlichemarine, Reichsmarine, and Kriegsmarine periods; what is lesser known and 
researched is the experience of the two German navies during the Cold War, and the 
intricacies of unification into what has become the German Navy of today.  
These common threads from history that manifest themselves in the traditions and 
roles of the modern day Bundesmarine will be weighed against the German military’s 
guiding principle of Innere Führung in an attempt to gain some universal lessons for the 
naval professional on how history and tradition play into the functioning of a professional 
naval institution operating within a democracy. As a technical note: A plethora of 
German sources exist that would be relevant to this thesis, but this author is limited to 
drawing upon English secondary sources and translated primary sources where available 
due to an inability to read German.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II of this thesis will analyze the origins of a German Navy, touching 
briefly on its role a symbol of nationalism under Chancellor Bismarck, and moving on to 
its place in Kaiser Wilhelm II’s drive to become a great maritime power the likes of Great 
Britain. The research in this chapter will pay specific mind to the search for a strategy in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century. Chapter III will gauge the effectiveness of the 
Versailles Treaty in quelling German naval ambitions during the Reichsmarine phase. 
The chapter will then analyze the problems that arise when a nation’s naval strategy is 
built around assumptions (i.e., British neutrality) and treaty constraints rather than reality. 
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The initial effectiveness of the Kriegsmarine under Hitler’s leadership, and the 
connection between the naval elites with their past will be assessed. The reasons for the 
failure of Germany’s U-boat campaign against the superior English sea power will be 
assessed, specifically as those strategic shortcomings relate to Germany’s ultimate failure 
in the war. Chapter IV will focus on the parallel development of two separate, but 
historically linked, naval organizations during the period of West and East Germany. 
Chapter V will assess the German Navy’s success in creating a unified historical 
monologue that provided a foundation for a unified German Navy to be successful. It will 
then provide historical examples of why a strategy that acknowledges Germany’s 
geography and is built on supporting a greater alliance has been the most effective in 
German naval history, and will address contemporary issues facing the German Navy as 
its roles expand ever more into expeditionary and transnational operations. Chapter VI 
will conclude by synthesizing the lessons learned through the preceding historical 
analysis into practical and universal takeaways for the naval professional serving any 
flag. 
 16 
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II. THE KAISERLICHE MARINE AND THE BID FOR WORLD 
POWER 
By the end of the 19th century, naval power emerged as the arbiter of world 
power in the age of imperialism. During this tumultuous time of industrial and 
technological growth, the German empire—with Kaiser Wilhelm II at the helm since 
1888—sought to ignore geostrategic realities and make a bid for world power through the 
creation a first-rate navy the likes of Great Britain. The Kaiser’s foreign policy centered 
around Weltpolitik (world policy), and he saw a large battle fleet as dictated in the 
writings of Mahan as a way of not only building credibility as a possible alliance partner 
with a second tier power, such as France or Russia, but as a way of gaining the respect of 
Great Britain as a peer. The pages of history resonate with the failure of German sea 
power by the end of World War I as a bid for world power—failure that is largely 
attributed to the effects of building a navy without understanding its grand strategic 
purpose and without a suitable basis of policy and sensible ends and means. This chapter 
will demonstrate how the construction of the High Seas Fleet was more an exercise in 
political control and consolidation of power at the hands of the Imperial Navy Office than 
an exercise in rational strategic decision-making. The key relationship between civilian 
leadership, constituents, and naval leadership will be analyzed as essential factors to the 
raising of a fleet where before none existed. 
A. ORIGINS OF A NAVY: THE STORY LEADING UP TO 1888 
To fully understand how the Navy as a tool of Weltpolitik came to be, a brief 
foray into the origins of the German Navy is of importance. In its Prussian history prior 
to 1870, Germany had no legacy of naval tradition and thus none of the framework in 
place required to support a navy. Bird argues that “the building of a German navy and a 
naval tradition where none had existed before could not proceed without the development 
of political, military, and strategic foundations.”35 Since Prussia was a continental power 
focused on other continental powers, this process happened slowly and haphazardly 
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under Prince Adalbert during the initial era of German unification and confederation; the 
navy at the time served more of a political purpose in providing a symbol for nationalism 
and less of a strategic purpose as a military institution. Nationalistic sentiment, and the 
prominence of liberal ideas like that of Friedrich List’s national political economy 
theories that espoused the importance of attaining maritime power in order to expand the 
empire and become a power player in world politics, helped in developing public support 
for German naval ambition. Perhaps most vexing to the construction of a fleet was that 
the Frankfurt Parliament, though strongly advocating the construction of a German Navy, 
had no power to tax the individual German states and thus was relegated to appealing to 
the individual states in a bid to raise funds for a fleet. 
The unification of Germany in 1871 resulted in a nation state with the financial 
capacity to build a fleet, but having little experience with navies and no consensus on 
what role exactly a fleet should carry out, initial efforts at fleet construction were 
haphazard and unguided. The Prussian naval ministry passed a ten-year fleet plan through 
the Reichstag in 1867 that called not only for sixteen armored warships to defend home 
waters, but 20 corvettes that could be used for foreign service.36 Of these, only five 
armored warships were built, a symptom of the indecision and reversals that 
characterized the German shipbuilding program in the first decades of the empire. 
Albrecht von Stosch (1871–83) went on to update this construction plan in 1873, but the 
plan, like others before it, suffered from “few direct connections to the strategic needs of 
the state.”37 The early naval plans all suffered from a lack of consensus on what purpose 
a navy should serve in connection to the state, and they predated considerations of the 
political-economic aspect of naval construction. Because “most pro-navy politicians did 
not view naval expenditure as a source of employment and income for their 
constituents,”38 inexpensive construction plans were favored over expensive ones. For 
this reason, animosity toward the construction of battleships existed and many in the 
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Reichstag preferred a strategy that focused on less expensive cruisers and torpedo 
boats—not necessarily because that was the best strategy, but because it was the most 
cost-effective. 
1. The Politics of Civil-Military Relations in the Imperial Period 
Denmark’s ability to impose a blockade on the German states during the 1848–50 
Schleswig-Holstein war is what seeded the nationalist sentiment for a navy; as Naval 
historian Lawrence Sondhaus aptly put it, “outrage over the Danish blockade generated a 
pro-navy sentiment that went hand in hand with the broader desire for German unity.”39 
Sondhaus contends that the main reason Germany had not built a fleet capable of 
preventing a small state like Denmark from blockading it can be attributed to cultural 
factors—a lack of precedent among the populace for having a navy—a hurdle that was 
“weakened only when the revolutionary enthusiasm of 1848-49 inspired young men from 
all over Germany to volunteer for naval service.”40 Prince Adalbert’s 1848 Denkschrift 
(memo), which Bird refers to as the “intellectual birth of the navy,” offered three strategic 
possibilities for a German navy: a “defensive” coastal defense, an “offensive” coastal 
defense and protection of trade, and an “independent sea power.”41 Germany, for the first 
time, had a vision of what its naval strategy could be, but as yet, no political basis or plan 
for realization to go along with it at a time when Germany was hardly unified and able to 
wield power in central Europe, to say nothing of the either French or British maritime 
power of that epoch. 
The relationship between the civilian leadership and populace and the military, is 
an important one to consider in analyzing the progress of the German Navy from the mid 
19th century until the beginning of the 20th century. Because fleets are expensive 
programs, and thus absorb large amounts of tax revenue, no naval ambition can be 
realized without the political support of the nation state and its citizens. An example of 
what happens when this relationship sours is manifest in the public relations nightmare 
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that was the Grosser Kurfürst disaster. On May 29, 1878, just 23 days after its 
commissioning, the battleship Grosser Kurfürst collided with the Koenig Wilhelm while 
steaming in formation. The collision sent the Kurfürst sinking into the depths of the 
North Sea along with 276 of its 500-man crew. Mishaps were commonplace during the 
first decades of the German navy owing to a lack of experience among the personnel, but 
this mishap in particular put a sour taste in the mouths of Germany’s naval enthusiasts 
and resulted in a popular loss of confidence in the navy at a critical time when the Reich 
was yet new. Not only was the inadequate training of personnel brought to light, but the 
public began to question the expenditure on fleet construction. As a result, major fleet 
construction initiatives were not again undertaken until Tirpitz and his propaganda 
machine entered the scene in the 1890s.42 
2. Manning the Fleet 
During the Bismarckian wars for unification from 1864 until 1871, the German 
Navy was treated as a supporting arm of the army as was the norm in the strategic culture 
of central Europe. This phenomenon carried over into the first two decades of the empire, 
evident not only in the navy’s role of coastal defense against a potential French threat, but 
in the fact that at its head the Navy saw leaders the likes of Stosch (1871–83) and Leo 
von Caprivi (1883–88), both of whom were army generals—as such, they treated naval 
strategy as an extension of infantry tactics and took myopic views as regards ship 
building. The early German Navy experienced a sort of identity crisis as its sailors took to 
drill and organization on the model of exacting Prussian army form, leaving little time for 
the technical practices akin to seamanship—as Sondhaus puts it, “Prussian army spit and 
polish went to ridiculous lengths.”43 That is not to say that the efforts of these generals at 
the helm of the early navy were ineffectual, for it was their organizing principles that laid 
the foundations in industry, in politics, and in public relations that were required before a 
navy aimed at sea power could come to fruition. In addition to the networks he forged, 
Stosch did his part to professionalize the officer corps by establishing Germany’s first 
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naval academy in Kiel during his tenure—placing emphasis on general education in 
matters relating to the naval practice. 
Two key problems became evident in the early raising of a professional corps of 
personnel to run the navy. When recruiting his officer cadre, Sondhaus points out that for 
Stosch, “practical experience—even bravery in wartime—failed to outweigh factors, such 
as inferior social background, poor education, and the stigma of onetime civilian sea 
service.”44 As such, the officer corps was more built around nobility and less around 
aptitude. Within the ratings, there was little consistency or long-running knowledge 
because the enlisted force was conscripted. Three-year conscription offered the men just 
enough time to receive training and serve actively in the fleet for perhaps a year before 
leaving the service. In comparison to the British Navy, which had a volunteer force, 
proficiency ranked far lower. Tirpitz would later twist this into a strength, claiming that 
because of conscription, Germany could more readily man their growing fleet in the early 
twentieth century than Britain could, but his was an argument strictly for quantity over 
quality.  
B. KAISER WILHELM II—“THE NEW COURSE” 
On June 15, 1888, Wilhelm II succeeded his father Frederick III as the King of 
Prussia and Emperor of Germany. Described as “a man of elegant superficiality,”45 the 
Kaiser had an affinity for the pomp and circumstance of naval traditions, and he was 
generally obsessed with all things associated with the navy. He brought this enthusiasm 
to bear in his foreign policy preferences. After firing Bismarck as chancellor and putting 
aside the former’s alliance policy and its limits to continental power, Kaiser Wilhelm 
brought about a “new course” in German foreign policy that focused on the fleet as a 
means to world power or, conversely, an inevitable national decline if Germany failed to 
match the imperialists. The Kaiser was an ardent believer in Mahan’s sea power theories 
that were en vogue during that era, but he also found himself intrigued by an alternate 
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option for sea power that was emerging on the scene at the turn of the century: The Jeune 
École. His vacillations over just what type of fleet Germany would need resulted in what 
is termed the “lost decade” in German navalism, and it was not until Admiral von Tirpitz 
became involved that politics, the German people, and the shipbuilding industry were 
sufficiently focused to actually undertake a respectable fleet construction policy.  
Wilhelm went about a massive re-ordering of the naval command structure that 
served his role as the supreme commander of naval force, with the ultimate goal of giving 
himself more control and creating a navy “completely dependent upon him.”46 On March 
28, 1889, he created the Marine-Kabinett (Navy Cabinet), an office within the monarchy 
that gave the Kaiser himself authority over the appointment of officers, presentation of 
awards and decorations, and overall vision for the fleet. He followed this move by 
splitting the roles of the Imperial Admiralty into two new offices, the Oberkommando 
(Naval High Command) for operational control of the navy and the Reichs-Marine-Amt 
(State Secretary of the Imperial Navy Office) for administrative matters. He also 
established the Admiralstab (Admiralty Staff), which took on functions similar to the 
Prussian General Staff by advising during peacetime and in wartime giving the Kaiser 
direct authority over naval matters through this office.47 By dividing the leadership of the 
navy in this way, the Kaiser effectively destroyed any unity of planning and command in 
the navy—things that not would be regained until Vice Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was 
appointed as State Secretary in 1897, where he proceeded to consolidate the power of his 
office and gain major sway within the Reichstag. Tirpitz recalls in his memoirs that 
during this time, naval plans were presented to the Reichstag “not so much upon 
requirements as upon the probability of their being granted,” which was only 
compounded by the fact that “every authority in the navy wanted and proposed 
something different.”48 
Just as Kaiser Wilhelm came to power, a great strategy debate was sweeping the 
maritime powers of the world within the age of imperialism. Although Wilhelm was 
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enraptured by Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power on History, and eventually became 
obsessed with the idea of a massive battle fleet that could afford Germany sea control and 
international respect, he was also influenced by the newly emergent Jeune École (young 
school) strategy espoused by French Admiral Theophile Aube. Calling for a completely 
different type of fleet composition, the Jeune École emphasized guerre de course and the 
use of smaller warships as the new face of maritime affairs, owing to the international 
nature of commerce and maintenance of overseas colonies. Such an approach would 
require a fleet of light cruisers for overseas service and thus stood in stark contrast to the 
battle fleet and ships of the line requirements of Mahan’s blue water school of thought. 
For all of the Kaiser’s strengths—a quick intellect, vision, and technical interest in 
navies—his weaknesses tended to stand in the way of progress. His mind was easily 
swayed, his vision would jump from one thing to the next, and although he made it his 
task to consolidate a great deal of control over the navy into his personal hands, he was 
not good at concentrated work or actually performing the important tasks that he had laid 
out for himself as regards building and running a navy. This all became evident with his 
vacillations over just what type of maritime power Germany should strive to be, and no 
consistency of direction was introduced until he appointed Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz as 
the State Secretary of the Imperial Navy Office. 
C. ADMIRAL ALFRED VON TIRPITZ AND THE HIGH SEAS FLEET 
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz served as State Secretary of the Navy Office—that is 
maritime minister in the imperial cabinet—during the nineteen pivotal years from 1897 to 
1916. He cut his teeth early in his career with the torpedo boat service and later as Chief 
of the cruiser squadron in Asia, but his true talent and contribution to the German Navy 
was in his penchant for politics and his passionate vision for a first-rate battleship fleet 
predicated on Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power theories of the day. Herwig describes 
him as “a manipulator of men, the forerunner of the modern professional manger, an 
expert parliamentary tactician, a capable organizer, and the forerunner of the twentieth-
century propaganda specialist.”49 His role in building the German navy expounds upon 
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the primacy of politics in naval matters. When it comes down to it, it was Tirpitz’s ability 
to control the Reichstag, and thus the purse strings, that made him so successful in 
enacting Germany’s first unified vision of a fleet construction plan. Where Tirpitz fell 
short was in understanding the strategic reason for his High Seas Fleet. 
Tirpitz understood that in order to pass his bills through the Reichstag, he had to 
first garner mass public support for naval expansion among the German people. Ardent 
propagandist that he was, he launched a multi-pronged information campaign that 
successfully built a precedent for his sea power ideas. He popularized naval journals, 
such as the Marine-Rundschau, distributed translated copies of Mahan’s The Influence of 
Sea Power on History to the public via serialized prints in newspapers and complete 
volumes to every ship in the fleet, and perhaps most importantly recruited hundreds of 
academics to his cause. Organizations, such as The Colonial League, the Pan-German 
League, and the Navy League, were vital instruments in his campaign to rally public 
support around navalism as a singular national cause, while distracting the public from 
the rival political parties that were simultaneously trying to garner support for their anti-
imperialist aims.50  
Tirpitz devised the Reichsmarineamt Nachrichtenbureau (Section for News and 
General Parliamentary Affairs)—a powerful propaganda tool that was used not only to 
foster support for a fleet among Germany’s societal elites and members of the Reichstag, 
but among the German populace as a whole. In this connection, a strong civil-military 
relationship was a vital aspect of Germany’s fleet construction program.51  
1. The Navy Bills 
Tirpitz first communicated his ideas regarding sea power to the Naval Office in 
1884 with his Dienstschrift IX, which at its core espoused strategic offensive as the 
primary concern for the fleet. He argued “national world trade, world industry, and to a 
certain extent high-seas fisheries, world transportation, and colonies are impossible 
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without a fleet capable of taking the offensive.”52 This memo was the first connection of 
the fleet to a policy of Weltpolitik, and demonstrated his “linking of naval power to 
economic power and the equation of economic power with political power.”53 Once he 
was able to win the Reichstag over with his shipbuilding plan, he was equally able to 
cement in the Kaisers psyche that Mahan’s “blue water” school was the course for 
German naval aspirations—not the Jeune École.  
The First Navy Bill was passed through the Reichstag in April 1898. Calling for 
19 battleships and 50 cruisers of various sizes by 1904, at an agreed upon expense of 
409M Goldmarks, the bill was seemingly innocuous.54 The significant clause of the bill 
that Tirpitz slipped in under the radar was the agreement that the battleships would be 
automatically replaced every 25 years. This bill secured regular fleet construction, 
enhanced the Kaiser’s power over the Reichstag, and provided work for a growing 
industrial base.55 His Second Navy Bill came later in June 1900, largely in response to 
the Boer War and the Boxer Rebellion, and called for twice as many ships and an 
unconstrained budget. Because this bill morally constrained the Reichstag to constructing 
a fixed number of ships, historian Ivo Nikolai Lambi argues, Tirpitz was able to increase 
the size and cost of the ships after the bill was passed—no one in the Reichstag would 
“assume the responsibility for making the legally stipulated ships come out small and bad 
because of inadequate appropriations.”56 His Second Navy Bill passed in 1900, and 
provided the Kaiser with what would later become his High Seas Fleet. The bill basically 
doubled the number of capital ships to be built, and left the budget open to be negotiated 
each year in the Reichstag. The first Navy Bill would have provided Germany with a fleet 
capable of deflecting French or Russian naval attack, but this Second Bill grabbed the 
attention of Great Britain and propelled Germany to the status of second naval power in 
the world.  
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As a domestic political weapon, Tirpitz’s navy bills served to fight the Social 
Democrats cause. By promoting German industry through guaranteed naval contracts, the 
shipbuilding program afforded capitalist stability to the proletariat workforce and de-
incentivized socialist and liberal backlash against the state. Within the Reichstag, Tirpitz 
aimed to consolidate as much power at the hand of the Kaiser as possible and block the 
Social Democrat’s aims of establishing a more parliamentarian government. Tirpitz also 
sought to garner support among Germany’s middle class for his and Wilhelm’s vision of 
an expansionist Germany, which he accomplished through propaganda campaigns and 
the increased standard of living afforded by industrial growth. 
2. Risk Theory and the Naval Arms Race 
Tirpitz’s fleet building strategy assumed that as long as Germany could maintain a 
fleet ratio of 2:3 with that of Great Britain, then Germany stood a chance in a naval battle 
against them. This calculus was based on the fact that Great Britain’s fleet, though 
numerically superior to Germany’s, was spread thin across the globe supporting its vast 
colonial empire. This idea formed the basis of Tirpitz’s “risk theory,” which argued that 
the 2:3 ratio would deter an aggressor because even if an aggressor beat them in battle, 
the enemy could still potentially face a third aggressor after having been softened by the 
German fleet. Dr. Rahn argues that “any power policy which included a claim to rule to 
seas interfered with Great Britain, was bound to encounter deep mistrust on the part of 
this strategically-minded sea power, a mistrust which could quickly turn out to be a 
danger to the Reich.”57 This was Tirpitz’s miscalculation, for he failed to anticipate the 
naval arms race with Britain that his battleship construction project incited. As indicated 
by Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill’s initiative in 1912 to build two capital ships 
for every one that Germany built, rather than pose as a deterrent to Britain’s sea power, 
Britain saw it as a direct threat to their livelihood and responded in kind.58 
Tirpitz had no delusions when he passed his Second Navy Bill that even with the 
increase in capital ships, Germany would not be a credible threat to Great Britain by 
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1905. This was acceptable, because at the time he was more concerned with having a 
fleet that increased Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit, or alliance value to other maritime 
nations, such as France or Russia. He observes in his memoirs that Germany’s first task 
was to create a fleet “which would give us alliance-value; and the second was a 
corresponding policy of alliance.”59 So even in its infancy the German navy was oriented 
toward alliance value, but in a different way than we find in the contemporary navy that 
is fully integrated into alliance security constructs. Tirpitz understood the realities of 
German economy and industry, and that it was no match to that of Britain’s in terms of 
ability to produce quantities of capital ships. He lost this grip on reality, however, when 
the HMS Dreadnaught was unveiled.  
Great Britain’s commissioning of the HMS Dreadnought on December 3, 1906 
threw a large wrench into Germany’s naval aspirations. This new class of battleship was 
a response to the technological realities of the day—the Mahanian concept of large fleet 
on fleet skirmishes was challenged by the increased range and accuracy of torpedoes and 
shipboard guns—Great Britain realized this when they incorporated large caliber 30.5cm 
guns in the Dreadnaught, their longer range was a response to the proliferation of torpedo 
boats carrying long range torpedoes.60 In keeping pace, Tirpitz passed the 1906 and then 
1908 Novelles (addendum to the Navy Bill) through the Reichstag that increased the 
replacement of capital ships from every 25 year to every 20, putting Germany on track to 
produce 3 dreadnaught-class battleships per year in place of outmoded pre-dreadnaught 
battleships and meet Tirpitz’s goal of 60 capital ships.61 Thus began the maritime arms 
race between Germany and Britain, driven by the fast pace of technological advancement 
during the era—but as Dr. Rahn argues, Germany was unable to keep pace with Britain’s 
shipbuilding program while still meeting the requirement of its large army.62 Herwig 
classifies this period leading up to the outbreak of war as “the most hectic, chaotic and, 
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for the Reich, fateful in modern European history.”63 The arms race cost Germany an 
inordinate amount of money, and the Reich was finding that taxes on consumer goods 
could no longer foot the bill. Tax reform had long been an avoided issue within the 
Reichstag, and the Army leadership was becoming distraught with the second seat they 
were taking to Tirpitz’s grand naval aspirations; this all culminated in the emergence of 
dissenting voices from the German leadership that began to question Germany’s naval 
aspirations. 
D. WORLD WAR I—THE WAR THAT CAME TO SOON 
Tirpitz recalls that Germany’s failure in the First World War “did not proceed 
from the acquisition of power, but from the weakness which did not know how to use that 
power either for the purpose of preserving or concluding peace, and in addition, from our 
illusions about our enemies, the nature of their war aims, their conduct of the war, and the 
nature of the economic war.”64 Along these same lines, Herwig contends the outbreak of 
war revealed “the utter fiasco of German strategic planning.”65 Tirpitz knew all along 
while he built his High Sea’s Fleet that Germany would still be no match for Great 
Britain in terms of all out war at sea, but he continually sold the lie that it was possible to 
the German people and to the Reichstag to ensure funding for his project. It took Britain’s 
Grand Fleet only a few days to gain sea control in the North Sea, and effectively to 
blockade German commerce. Initial conflict between the Grand Fleet and the High Seas 
Fleet at Heligoland resulted in the virtually unopposed loss of one of the Kaiser’s new 
dreadnoughts, and for fear of losing any more to combat, Wilhelm II ordered them back 
to port and thus relegated his battle force to a “fleet in being,” further facilitating 
Britain’s distant blockade strategy which had an attritional effect on the central powers of 
slow, but fearsome results.  
A running strategy debate between the Imperial Naval Office and the Admiralty 
that permeated the years leading up to World War I (WWI) was that of the strategic 
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defensive versus the strategic offensive. Tirpitz, as the State Secretary, was a strong 
proponent of the strategic defensive—the value of the High Seas Fleet, as far as he was 
concerned, was in concentrating its forces in the mouth of the Elbe and presenting 
England with the looming threat of a “fleet in being,” while retaining elements of coastal 
defense in support of fleet action. This view ran counter to Friedrich Count von 
Baudissin’s (Chief of the Admiralty staff from 1908 on), who strongly believed that the 
fleet was best used in open combat on the high seas in an offensive manner.66 
The Battle of Jutland (Skagerak to the German) in 1916 revealed just how fateful 
had been the idea of German offensive sea power against Great Britain. Tirpitz’s risk 
theory was based on a British close blockade of German forces at their stronghold in 
Heligoland Bight, but in reality the British had no incentive to meet the German’s in open 
sea battle because they could just as easily conduct a distant blockade as a form of 
economic warfare and avoid decisive battle in which the Skagerak fight showed that the 
in qualitative terms, the British were often inferior to the Germans in tactics and 
equipment. The High Seas Fleet decided at last to bring the decisive naval battle to the 
Grand Fleet in May 1916 off the coast of Jutland, and although in the ensuing battle the 
High Seas Fleet was able to attain tactical victory in the battle (sinking 14 British ships to 
only 11 German ships lost), the tactical victory did not amount to any type of strategic 
victory for Germany because of the larger strategic problems of war for the central 
powers. Jutland was the High Seas Fleet’s only adventure a la Mahan across the North 
Sea, and after limping home post-battle, it did not set out against the Grand Fleet again 
due to the realization that in a further encounter, the superior British fleet would destroy 
the High Seas Fleet. It was at Jutland that the concept of a risk fleet was debunked, and 
after that encounter German strategic thinking shifted over to guerre de course, where the 
U-boats proved their worth over the dreadnought battleships.67  
Despite the High Seas Fleet’s ineffectiveness in battle, Tirpitz stood by his 
imperative of the strategic offensive, and only after a year of inactivity on the part of the 
High Seas Fleet did he concede to the effectiveness of guerre de course. This decision led 
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to the offensive use of what heretofore had been an auxiliary defensive weapon, the 
submarine that replaced the commerce raider on the model of Graf Spee’s cruiser 
squadron, for instance, the Emden. The rising success of U-boat commerce raiding 
missions led to a new strategic direction for the fleet. Clearly, Tirpitz’s death grip on the 
offensive as a possible strategy was more tied to maintenance of his credibility for 
undertaking such an economically damaging construction plan, and an attempt to secure 
monies that the Reichstag was increasingly redirecting to the army in support of its active 
land campaign. Wolfgang Wegener, one of Tirpitz’s greatest critics, likened his strategy 
to a “rider without a horse,” arguing that his misinterpretation of Mahan’s sea control 
theories completely ignored the Geo-strategic realities of Germany. As was demonstrated 
throughout the war, Britain had no reason to meet the High Seas Fleet in battle when 
distant blockade could be employed to affect Germany’s wartime economy without 
contact. Germany’s only successes at sea were in guerre de course tactics at the hand of 
cruisers and U-boats, completely contrary to the strategic ideas that Germany’s navy was 
built upon.68 This unintended outcome of the war was a newfound appreciation for the 
submarine. Tirpitz had always considered the U-boat projects as ancillary, but the 
damage they were able to inflict on British shipping during the war was substantial and 
influential in the development of Hitler’s naval strategy in the war to come. A further 
analysis of this will follow in the next two chapters. 
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III. FROM REICHSMARINE TO KRIEGSMARINE: REBIRTH 
FROM DEFEAT, AND THE RESURGENCE OF GLOBAL 
AMBITION 
World War I signified a strategic and moral disaster for the German navy. The 
revolution that had swept Germany in the fall of 1918 within defeat had begun among the 
bored sailors infected with Spartakist agitation. The naval leadership had caused the 
revolt with an insane kamikaze idea of self immolation as a final act of Wagnerian 
restoral of honor through mass suicide. Thus, in the immediate post war epoch, the High 
Seas Fleet—the crown jewel of the Tirpitz shipbuilding program—lay atop the seabed at 
Scapa in Scotland, scuttled there by its own commander Admiral von Reuter on June 21, 
1919. The thought of the allied powers splitting up and laying claim to the ships of the 
High Seas Fleet, which was to the German navy a symbol of its greatness, was just too 
much to bear. The scuttling of the fleet served to reinvigorate the spirit of the officers, 
while also depriving the victors of their war spoils.69 Not only that, but the moral and 
strategic suicide of the navy in the last moments of the war swept clean the slate, made 
more clean yet still by the dictates of Versailles, and the new Republic was seemingly 
unburdened of Tirpitz’s strategic failure, although the former had no apparent desire for 
world power in 1919, only the imperative to survive.  
The High Seas Fleet never did live up to the Mahanian strategic vision that 
Admiral Tirpitz had for the navy in 1897, its inaction during the war certainly did nothing 
to support the Kaisers foreign policy of Weltpolitik as he had anticipated it would. The 
Versailles Treaty set the starkest limits on the size and character of the fleet, and most 
important, the anti military and anti naval public opinion in the young Republic posed a 
stark contrast to the navalism of a generation earlier. In this light, the scuttling of the fleet 
and the collapse of the Empire at the end of the war afforded Germany the opportunity to 
pursue better forms of statecraft and in conjunction, a naval strategy more fitting to the 
geo-strategic realities of this central-European non-Anglo-Saxon power—a course that 
proved hardly practical and which became ensnarled in the problematic civil military 
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structure of the Weimar Republic, where domestic conflicts and problems of statecraft 
revived illusions of naval power that were devoid of means and which resided in the 
realm of fantasy.  
Faced with massive reductions to manpower, armaments, gross tonnage of 
allowed naval shipping, and tactical capabilities as delineated in the Treaty of Versailles, 
the Treaty of London, and the Five Power Treaty—and a proven dearth of strategic 
purpose—the Reichsmarine (The name given to the German navy from 1918–1935) spent 
the immediate years following the war in a struggle for survival as junior beside the 
army, itself organized as a cadre for a future great power, but devoid of modern weapons 
and the command and brains appropriate for the task. As Bird points out, the 
Reichsmarine “was lost in the shadows of the army and relegated to a secondary support 
role unable to reach even the personnel and material limits imposed by the Treaty of 
Versailles.”70 There was much support within the Reichstag to absorb the navy into the 
army, abandoning the pursuit of sea power and using the navy for coastal defense, mine 
sweeping, and support roles only. It took a justification of the Imperial Navy’s role prior 
to and during the First World War through Grand Admiral Tirpitz’s propaganda 
campaigns and autocratic control of the officer corps at the hand of Grand Admiral 
Raeder to ensure the navy’s future. Once its survival was assured, the Reichsmarine set 
about the process of reconstructing its personnel and developing a naval strategy that fit 
within the bounds of the limitations set by the multitude of post-war treaties, and also, 
like the army, to lay the foundation for some revival on a new ideal of world power. In 
this way, German strategy during the interwar period was shaped more by external 
factors than by the specific strategic needs of the Republic—a phenomenon that took 
place until Chancellor Adolf Hitler and his National Socialists Party rose to power in 
1933. From that point on, Hitler directed a naval strategy that suited the needs of the state 
rather than the dictates of the international community—those needs at the time being 
Weltmachtstreben (the struggle for world power).  
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A. WEIMAR REPUBLIC: CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN CRISIS 
Civil military relations within the Republic existed in a state of crisis, advanced 
from a deficit that began with the military failures of the High Seas Fleet, and the legacy 
of mutinies that occurred during the final days of WWI.71 The civilian view of the navy 
following the war was poor, and it was only compounded by the events of March 13, 
1920, when former member of the Reichstag Wolfgang Kapp attempted to seize control 
of the government and establish himself as chancellor. This action, known as the Kapp 
Putsch, served to teach some formidable lessons to the officer corps of the Navy. When 
the Chief of the Admiralty, Vice Admiral von Trotha, was informed that a new 
provisional government had been put in place, he immediately made the navy available to 
this government. Von Trotha had at his disposal the rightist Erhardt Brigade, which was 
an illegal 15,000 man naval detachment that refused to disband as directed by the 
Versailles Treaty. Although Trotha was not actively involved in the Putsch, he and many 
other naval leaders were initially accused of resisting the constitution, and after the whole 
ordeal was resolved, Trotha and the other officers involved were dismissed from the 
service, thus diluting the leadership of the navy at a critical time of rebuilding.  
Public opinion of the navy faltered further after this event; the naval leadership 
had already been alienated from the political right with the mutinies of 1918, and now the 
political left alienated the navy as well for supporting the Putsch. Raeder recalls that the 
remaining naval leaders learned from this event that they must at all times follow, “the 
path of complete abstinence from every type of party politics, and of unconditional 
loyalty to the State and to the government chosen by its people.” Essentially, the navy 
had been trained to avoid becoming embroiled in the political.72 As a result of this 
aversion to the political, the Navy’s relationship with the Republic was weak. The 
Weimar government failed at working with the military, and a rift existed between the 
military leadership and the civilian leadership. The public perception of the navy took  
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some time to repair, and Institutions, such as the Skagerrak Club, were essential during 
the interwar period in promoting a healthy relationship between the civilian population 
and the naval personnel.  
In order to understand the trajectory of the German navy during the interwar 
period, it is important to understand the political context within which the navy was 
operating. Three basic political forces were in existence within the republic: The Weimar 
Coalition—consisting of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Catholic Centre 
Party (CCP), and the liberal German Democratic Party (DDP)—whose foreign policy 
was based on pacifism and respecting the bounds of the Treaty of Versailles and the 
renunciation of war agreed upon in the Briand-Kellogg Pact. On the far right-wing, the 
National Socialists—an anti-parliamentarian camp—sought to reestablish German 
national prestige and pave the way for realpolitik through the buildup of military power 
outside the bounds of the Versailles Treaty. On the far left was the Communist party, also 
anti-parliamentarian, but in favor of developing a communist form of government within 
Germany. During the Weimar period, the officers of the navy aligned themselves with the 
coalition government, adhering to the lessons learned from the Kapp Putsch to remain 
servants to the state and not become embroiled in the political. Once Hitler came to 
power in 1933, the navy re-aligned itself with National Socialism and its foreign policy 
goal of attaining world power.  
B. POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTED HISTORY AND THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF STRATEGIC THINKING  
In the early years of the Reichsmarine until about 1924, a great deal of infighting 
and finger-pointing and invocations of the stab in the back in print occurred among the 
defeated naval leaders of the former Imperial Navy. Grand Admiral Tirpitz fired what 
Bird terms the “opening salvo” of a memoirs war in 1919 that would span a decade, 
blaming the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg for the inaction of the High Seas 
Fleet during the war, and attributing the failure of the battle fleet concept to them.73 
Tirpitz maintained the position that “the fleet could have fulfilled its destiny, and could 
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have aided us to secure an honorable peace, if a right use had been made of it.”74 His 
critical assessments were not limited to the political leadership, but targeted other 
prominent naval leaders as well. In response to this, a series of memoirs and articles went 
into publication refuting Tirpitz’s claims and splitting the pool of navy supporters into 
pro- and anti-Tirpitz schools. Critics, such as retired Admiral Lothar Persius, Eckart 
Kehr, and Admiral Wolfgang Wegener, spoke out against the justification of the High 
Seas Fleet, damaging its legacy and thus weakening the position for a future resurgence 
of German navalism. This infighting went on unchecked until 1927, when Prince 
Heinrich of Prussia—realizing that the lack of solidarity among the officer corps was 
damaging to the credibility of the navy at a time when it was on the brink of 
dissolution—appealed to the naval leaders for a “cease fire” to bring an end to the back 
and forth vitriol and focus efforts on more productive things.75  
Rahn argues “during the Weimar Republic the Navy had great difficulties in 
adapting to the new republican form of government.”76 Bird points out that in the years 
directly following the war, the naval leadership “sought to save the ‘spirit’ of the navy 
from collapse in 1918–1919 and was not only committed to but expected a military 
revision of Germany’s post-war position.”77 The personnel of the navy were stymied by 
what Tobias Philbin terms the civil military “stigma of defeat and surrender.”78 Tirpitz 
focused on keeping Seemachtideologie (ideology of sea power) alive, glossing over the 
complete failure that was the High Seas Fleet in WWI and creating a precedent for a 
revised German sea power. Raeder recalls, “one of the Navy’s main problems in the new 
decade was the low morale brought about by the armistice and peace conditions.”79 
Because the terms of the armistice dictated that the German navy could only retain a few 
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of its pre-dreadnought battleships, and placed heavy restrictions on any future 
shipbuilding program, the future of the German navy was necessarily bleak. This had 
adverse effects on the morale of the German sailors. The allied plan of extraditing many 
high ranking naval officials—despite being stopped due to such massive German 
backlash—served to hurt morale even more.  
One of the most outspoken critics of Tirpitz’s strategic concepts during WWI was 
Wolfgang Wegener, whose seminal work The Naval Strategy of the World War argued 
that the employment of the High Seas Fleet completely ignored the geo-strategic realities 
of Germany.80 To understand Wegener’s argument, a summary of Mahan’s six principles 
of sea power are provided:  
I.  Geographical Position  
II.  Physical Conformation 
III.  Extent of Territory  
IV.  Number of Population  
V.  Character of the People  
VI.  Character of the Government, including therein the national institutions.81  
Wegener’s main argument was that in failing to recognize the first three of 
Mahan’s preconditions for attaining sea power, the Imperial Navy was left to chase an 
impossible strategy. Having limited access to the sea and a numerically inferior navy, 
Wenger argued that Germany could not possibly gain control of the Atlantic sea-lanes to 
which Britain had free access, and thus could not possibly challenge British command of 
the sea.82 This type of dissenting historical analysis was not accepted by the naval leaders 
during the fragile times of the Reichsmarine, and as Bird points out, top officials, such as 
Erich Raider, realized that any discrediting of Tirpitz and his concept of naval strategy 
would force the navy to “lose its tradition and be forced to rethink its historic and future 
role in national defense.”83 
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Aside from gaining solidarity among the officer corps, the key task of the naval 
leadership in the early years of the Republic was to justify its existence to the Reichstag 
and the German people in the civil military relations of the new republic. Peifer points 
out that “any condemnation of Tirpitz’s battle-fleet concept would make future requests 
for ship ‘builds’ hard to justify before a hostile Reichstag.”84 In this connection, the navy, 
like the army, set about the task of creating a historical narrative that highlighted the 
strongpoints and overlooked the weaknesses of the Kaiserliche Marine’s actions in WWI. 
Led by Admiral Eberhard Mantey, the German Naval Archive undertook in 1919 an 
expansive construction of German naval history, and the lessons drawn were not 
necessarily correct lessons but were geared toward justifying the battle fleet (despite its 
minimal contribution to the war) as a way of assuring the future for the German navy.85 
Bird argues that during this time, “the opportunity to break with the past and explore new 
directions and strategic alternatives was ignored in favor of maintaining a view of the 
future that included a large blue water navy,”86 contributing largely to the “intellectual 
impoverishment” of German naval strategic thinking during the interwar period. Rahn 
argues, “the Germans failed to draw the correct conclusions from the political and 
military scale of the defeat in 1918,”87 perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the 
ways the German navy connected with its past during the Weimar years. Such a 
phenomenon was in accord with the civil military relations of the epoch, which were 
noteworthy for the formation of legend and the refusal of professional soldiers and sailors 
to acknowledge their own role in defeat and their own baleful insistence of an unfeasible 
civil military system in the Weimar Republic.  
Despite the fact that Tirpitz actually backed unrestricted submarine warfare in the 
final years of World War I, in the interwar period he stood strongly behind the notion that 
a better outcome of the war would have been possible if the political leadership at the 
time would have embraced the use of the High Seas Fleet in offensive warfare against the 
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British Grand Fleet instead of relegating the fleet to inactivity after the battle of Jutland 
(Skagerrak).88 In this way, Tirpitz tried to shift focus away from the failure of his “risk 
theory” concept and lay the onus on ineffective policy instead. He believed that a  
“ ‘thorough and fair history’ would vindicate the creation of the Imperial Navy’s High 
Seas Fleet.”89 This was all part of his campaign to justify his fleet construction program 
in the public eye and build a precedent for a reconstruction of the fleet along the same 
lines of the Imperial German navy—flying in the face of those in the Reichstag who 
would just assume see the navy be disbanded and its roles given to the army. 
Theoretical conceptions of naval strategy evolved during this time to blend 
elements of Mahan’s sea power concept with Aube’s commerce warfare strategy. 
German naval thinkers embraced the idea of a battle fleet, but devised new strategic roles 
for it. Rather than merely targeting an opponent’s fleet, German strategic thinking during 
the interwar years shifted toward a battle fleet that could target an opponent’s commerce. 
Despite the requirement that the battle fleet concept be glorified in naval thinking, it was 
impossible to ignore the successes of the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign that 
was undertaken against allied shipping in WWI. Strategy, then, was shaped by the need 
to justify the past while still extracting some useful lessons from it. The concept of a new 
strategic role for the battle fleet would carry over into Hitler’s strategic thinking, manifest 
in the intended role for the Bismarck, the largest battleship of the time, which was to be 
used against allied commercial shipping rather than against allied battle fleets. 
C. TREATIES, LIMITATIONS, AND THE EFFECT ON NAVAL 
CONSTRUCTION AND STRATEGY 
1. The Treaty of Versailles 
The Treaty of Versailles, which was signed on June 28, 1919, set the stage on 
which Germany’s Weimar period was defined, and in many ways, created the conditions 
that led to the eventual resurgence of political ambition that would be experienced a 
decade and a half later when Adolf Hitler rose to power. Politically, the treaty forced 
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Germany to admit guilt for the disaster that was WWI. Economically, the conditions set 
by the treaty pushed Germany into massive recession with the almost absolute deflation 
of the Deutschmark currency. Psychologically, the morale of the German people was 
crushed—but the miscalculation of the victorious allies who wrote the terms of the treaty 
was that they believed it could, in Raeder’s words, “keep the German people shackled 
forever.”90 In reality, the war guilt placed on the German populace by the treaty 
contributed to the rise of German nationalism and set the conditions for the National 
Socialists to come to power. With all of this said, the treaty was a half-measure that 
despite placing heavy restrictions on German armed forces, was impossible to fully 
enforce and thus allowed for stirrings of resentment and ambition to grow. Dr. Rahn 
concludes “Like other parts of Germany’s political and military elite, the German naval 
leadership did not reconcile itself to the Treaty of Versailles.”91 
In his memoirs, Admiral Raeder argues that one of the main objectives of the 
treaty was “to limit Germany’s naval potential so that any resurgence of German sea 
power to a point where it would influence power politics would be impossible,”92 the 
specifics of which are detailed in the following paragraph. 
The following summary outlines the major restrictions placed on the 
Reichsmarine by The Treaty of Versailles, as stated in Section II of the Treaty document. 
Total German naval forces were limited to six Deutschland class pre-dreadnought 
battleships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and 12 torpedo boats, and all ships under 
construction at the time of the treaty were to be broken up. Maximum displacement for 
replacement ships to those already in commission was capped at 10,000 tons for 
battleships, 6,000 tons for cruisers, 800 tons for destroyers, and 200 tons for torpedo 
boats. Stocks of naval munitions were forbidden, and heavy limitations were placed on 
the type and amount of war materials that German ships were permitted to retain 
onboard. Conscription was abolished and the navy directed to maintain an all-volunteer 
force, with no cross training of merchant marine personnel permitted, and maximum 
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manpower was capped at 15,000 personnel (to include a maximum of 1,500 officers). All 
German warships interned in allied or neutral ports were to be surrendered to allied 
control, and Germany was forbidden to maintain submarines or aircraft in its naval 
inventory (in an effort to prevent any future policy of unrestricted submarine warfare the 
likes of what Germany enacted against the allies toward the end of the war).93  
Admiral Raeder argued, “the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles in 
June 1919 were so severe that it took a special plea by the Chief of the Admiralty to get 
the Navy to view them as a challenge rather than a death sentence.”94 The limitation of a 
10,000-ton maximum displacement for battleships presented the Reichstag with the 
dilemma of needing to very carefully design the specifications for the next generation of 
German battleship. With only 10,000 tons to work with, a compromise would have to be 
made on armor, speed, or gun size. The ultimate decision by 1928 was to go with the 
Panzerschiff design, commonly known in English as the “Pocket Battleship,” which was 
essentially a cruiser with six 28-cm guns for a main battery and eight 15-cm guns as a 
secondary, medium armor, high efficiency diesel engines for long range cruising, and a 
26 knot maximum speed. Designed to be more armored than the fastest ships, and faster 
than the most armored ships, the “pocket battleship” was a manifestation of German 
ingenuity and making the best of the conditions set by Versailles.95 More important than 
the actual tactical capabilities of the Pocket Battleships was the psychological effect that 
they had on Britain, which Thomas Hoerber argues was the true advantage of these 
designs.96 Philbin points out that this design was “the deliberate result of a German naval 
decision to circumvent the intention of the Versailles Treaty to keep the Germans 
confined to the mud flats of the Elbe.”97 An unfortunate side effect of the unveiling of the 
pocket battle ship was the French response, a 26,000 ton ship with 33-cm guns, which 
sparked the next phase of the European naval arms race.  
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Although the republic undertook a secret military rearmament program that 
exceeded the limits placed by the Versailles Treaty, Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer point 
out that the secret program was not significantly more than the public one, “In financial 
terms, the sums spent in the 1920s on secret rearmament programmes, the ‘X-
budget,’never exceeded 10 per cent of the ordinary (and disclosed) military budget.”98 
What was significant, however, about the covert construction plans was the establishment 
of infrastructure for a future U-boat service. Germany was prohibited by treaty from 
constructing or maintaining submarines, but during the years of the Reichsmarine, a 
framework for training and outfitting an officer corps for some future submarine fleet 
was put together. 
In 1933, however, the civil military universe in Germany changed in a way that 
fulfilled the hopes of those who refused to abandon world power. Adolf Hitler nourished 
his own version of Tirpitz’s ideals, but within a regime of exceptional aggressiveness and 
a single-minded drive for world power via a continental strategy. Nonetheless, the advent 
of the Nazi government made for a strategic revolution for German naval thought and 
practice.  
2. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement 
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, concluded June 18, 1935, limited 
Germany’s naval strength to 35% of Britain’s, and was politically significant in that it 
replaced the unfavorable conditions set by the Versailles Treaty. This agreement gave 
Germany the freedom publically to rearm while still maintaining a favorable relationship 
with Great Britain, which was a relationship that Chancellor Hitler valued greatly. 
Unfortunately, this measure was never seen as more than a stopgap in Germany’s eyes, 
and interim measure to be superseded by follow on concessions from the other European 
powers. At a point when the policy of continental power had reached a climax after the 
annexation of the rest of Czechia, on April 28, 1939, Hitler publically denounced the 
Anglo-German naval agreement, giving away his intentions to construct a full-scale 
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battlefleet with the intention that Britain would view this expanded German naval power 
as an incentive not to become involved in Germany’s intended continental military 
affairs. Hitler’s attitudes toward Britain had changed due to the changing international 
political system, spurred on mostly by the naval arms race incited by Japan’s withdrawal 
from the London agreement on naval force restrictions in 1936. Hitler had always 
excluded Britain from his naval operation planning, but now considered her as a possible 
adversary 
D. GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY LEADING INTO WORLD WAR II 
Grand Admiral Tirpitz based his construction program for the Imperial German 
navy on Alfred Mahan’s theory that battle fleets were the key to attaining control of the 
sea. This theory was proven to be a poor fit for the realities of Germany’s geographical 
and political circumstances, and as it turns out the Jeune École brand of naval strategy 
worked out much better for Germany during the unrestricted submarine war that was 
waged against allied shipping in the second half of WWI. Despite these lessons, the 
strategy debate of battle fleet versus cruiser warfare continued during the interwar period. 
Just as the development of naval technology during the Weimar period was determined 
by the limits of the Treaty of Versailles, the development of a naval strategy that 
supported German foreign and domestic policy was shaped by the treaty limits as well. 
Naval operational planning at the time was limited to coastal activities against a French 
or Polish threat, and no delusions about the supremacy of the British fleet were 
cultivated.  
Philbin argues that during the Weimar period, “German naval-political strategy 
concentrated on a corps wide effort to resell the navy as a vitally needed instrument of 
German national power—See Geltung (Sea Power).”99 This meant convincing the 
German people that the High Seas Fleet was an example of successful German sea power 
and justifying Tirpitz’s shipbuilding programs, which was accomplished through 
propaganda and selective history. Strategically, the Reichsmarine was preparing itself to 
make the same mistakes that the Kaiserliche Marine made, but naval strategy at this time 
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was driven more by the desire to justify building a fleet than by the actual practical 
application of a fleet. Perhaps the greatest advancement of German naval strategic 
understanding in the interwar period was the realization that Germany’s geographic 
position dictated a strategic offensive posture in any naval battle, and gone was the notion 
that the fleet could hope to take up the strategic defensive around Heligoland and wait for 
an opposing navy to bring the battle to them. This understanding, along with the 
advancement of the idea that German naval power should target an opponent’s commerce 
and not its naval fleet shaped the naval strategy that would be employed in World War II 
(WWII). This embracing of the idea that commerce warfare was vital to German strategic 
success, however, did not represent an abandonment of the High Seas Fleet concept. 
Rather, German naval thinkers took the stance that a future German battle fleet would be 
employed in commerce raiding, with supplementary action coming from a U-boat force. 
There has been some debate over the continuity of the German navy’s global 
ambitions from the Kaiserliche marine through to the Kriegsmarine, the Reichsmarine 
could not afford to adopt a revisionist policy due to the restrictions set forth by the 
Versailles Treaty and the unpopularity of naval adventurism within the political circles of 
the day. Bird argues the goals of Imperial Germany and the Third Reich were the same, 
and that “the rise of National Socialism and the origins of the Second World War are 
closely intertwined with the goals of Germany’s ruling elite.”100 Rahn points out “after 
1933, the Navy eventually became subject to Hitler’s long-term ambitions for dominating 
the world and the seas in particular,”101 but that orientation had already existed 
clandestinely among many of the officer corps of the Reichsmarine, and even among the 
political elite. It was, after all, Chancellor Bruning who in 1931 said in his christening 
speech for the Deutschland Panzerschif “we can forget our long period of suffering if 
other nations will grant us the same national pride and the same love of our country 
which they claim for themselves.”102 It was not a stretch for the navy to get back on the 
horse of global ambition once the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles were tossed aside. 
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Germany’s political elite during the Weimar period, though not necessarily seeking 
Weltmachtstreben, did seek national pride and parity with the other European powers.  
E. THE KREIGSMARINE AND GERMANY’S RESURGENT NAVAL 
AMBITIONS 
The military code of 21 May 1935 renamed the navy to the Kriegsmarine, an institution 
that was eventually to become intimately tied to Hitler’s global ambitions. During this 
phase of the German navy, it in many ways became a reflection of Germany’s national 
politics. In the beginning at least, a key feature of Hitler’s attitude toward the navy was 
his conviction that Germany must make all efforts to maintain a friendly posture toward 
England, and that a resurgent naval arms race with the superior maritime power was to be 
avoided. This was evident in the combat instructions issued to the navy on 27 May 1936 
that “rejected the idea of a conflict with Britain.”103 Bennett and Bennett point out that 
early in Hitler’s tenure, none of the great naval powers were seen as potential 
adversaries.104 The leadership of the Kriegsmarine held a strategic vision for the navy 
that differed from Hitler’s in that Grand Admiral Raeder viewed all out economic warfare 
against Great Britain as the only path to German maritime dominance, whereas in the 
early years Hitler still firmly believed that the war would be a short one and attacking 
Britain’s economy would not be required. Hitler’s incorrect assumption was that as long 
as Britain’s overseas interests were not affected, she would accept Germany’s 
expansionist foreign policy.105 He viewed the 1935 Anglo-German naval pact, which 
allowed for a German naval strength that matched 35% of Britain’s (a major increase 
from the Versailles limits) as an indicator from England that Germany was free to pursue 
its continental objectives, which was just a stepping stone for Hitler’s greater world-
power objectives.106 
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The major naval strategy debate leading into World War II was between those in 
the Grosskrieg camp who stood by the battleship as the dominant naval weapon, and 
those in the Kleinkrieg camp whom espoused submarines and commerce warfare.107 This 
debate was a vital one, in that it would shape the character of German shipbuilding and 
thus determined what kind of fleet the Kriegsmarine had at its disposal for the war. 
Within the naval leadership, Admiral Raeder stood firmly in the battleship camp postured 
against Admiral Dönitz and his advocacy of a strong U-boat force. Hitler tended to place 
more merit in the development of a strong battle fleet, but his preference was not based 
on naval-strategic terms so much as his adamant desire for eventual entente with Great 
Britain. In Hitler’s view, the type of commerce warfare that Dönitz envisioned would 
ruin any future peace with Great Britain, which was something he simply would not 
subscribe to. Deist points out “Hitler’s stubborn insistence on the construction of 
battleships in connection with his directive of 27 January [1939] seemed, as in the Tirpitz 
era, to open the way to the build-up of a fleet embodying Germany’s claim to be a sea 
power and thus, in the navy’s view, a world power.”108 From a geo-strategic standpoint, 
the lessons of World War I all indicate that German naval power could emanate from a 
strategy of guerre de course—trying to counter Britain’s sea power in conventional terms 
was a lost cause. Regardless, Hitler’s preference for the construction of an offensive 
surface fleet was manifest in his rejection of the naval proposals of 1937–39 that called 
for a shift toward U-boat and cruiser construction, and his adoption of the 1939 Z-plan 
that called for Deutschland class pocket battleships and Bismarck class battleships.109 
This fleet plan “represented the core of a Weltmachtflotte which would be used in a final 
confrontation with the other sea powers.”110 Hitler was convinced that war would not 
come until 1944, and thus believed that Germany would have enough time to build up its 
fleet in preparation for conflict.111 It seems as though Germany would repeat the same 
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mistakes from its First attempt at navalism. Because there was a lack of consensus on the 
direction in which fleet construction should go during the interwar years, argues Rahn, 
Germany once again found itself in the position “when the war came, the Navy was 
totally unprepared for it.”112 
Raeder’s leadership was pivotal in the early years of the Kriegsmarine, and he had 
a true understanding that the navy had “far-reaching political significance.”113 He, like 
Tirpitz before him, understood that fleet construction required long-term planning, 
understanding that “a strong and long-term policy of ship construction in peace is 
therefore an essential part of strategy in war.”114 Raeder did his best to reintegrate the 
navy into politics in order to support the realization of his long-term construction goals. 
As a result of this naval-political integration, however, “he could not prevent political 
decisions from playing an increasingly important role in the naval construction 
programme.”115 Despite his work to focus the rearming and construction of the German 
navy, it all occurred in a vacuum from the other services, as Deist points out “the services 
made their basic decisions without consulting or even conferring with each other.”116 
This phenomenon was only made worse by Hitler’s rejection of the concept of a unified 
Wehrmacht. 
The U-boat arm of the Kriegsmarine was initially very successful at denying the 
British access to the oceans. As Bernd Stegmann points out, “it became clear that on the 
whole, as in the First World War, the U-boat was still the most effective weapon in the 
battle against the flow of supplies to Britain. Its successes against enemy shipping were 
far greater than those of the pocket battleships.”117 Advancements in radio technology 
during the interwar period resulted in vastly changed tactics during WWII, due to the 
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instantaneous nature of communications. Headquarters was able to disseminate orders to 
ships no matter where they were, which allowed for the execution of operations plans of a 
higher complexity than was possible during WWI. Additionally, Germany’s development 
of the Enigma encoding device allowed for secure two-way communication between 
operational units at sea. This gave Admiral Dönitz the tools he needed to develop the 
Wolf Pack tactics used by U-boats in WWII, which were coordinated attacks on allied 
convoys that proved to be very effective until allied anti-submarine war-fighting 
capability (especially in the field of radio direction-finding, and code breaking) improved 
toward the end of the war—a phenomenon that rendered Dönitz’s U-boats, and the 
associated tactics more or less useless. 
Because the warships of the navy were becoming increasingly complex, they 
required men with strong technical aptitudes to run them. Specific professions, such as 
metalworkers and mechanics, were in high demand, especially in the U-boat arm of the 
Kriegsmarine. Timothy Mulligan argues, “by drawing upon specific professions from all 
regions, the Kriegsmarine established itself as truly national in character.”118 Whereas in 
the Kaiserliche Marine, the social composition of the force consisted mainly of men with 
traditional familiarity with maritime activities from the northern regions of Germany, the 
Kriegsmarine represented a more even distribution from the other regions of the Reich. 
Another aspect of this was the fact that northerners, who were more aware of the risks 
associated with U-boat service, avoided U-boats and opened up more room for the men 
from central and south Germany who did not necessarily know any better. The U-boat 
arm itself, which out of the 17.9 million Germans called to service for the war only 
consisted of 41,500 men, was a very elite corps.119 The men of the U-boat corps 
“received the material benefits of their branch—higher pay, better food, and greater 
opportunity for advancement—as well as the prestige and publicity accorded a combat 
elite.”120 Regarding the political makeup of the Kriegsmarine officer corps, although 
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leaders, such as Raeder and Dönitz, adamantly claimed that the navy was for the most 
part an apolitical organization, some studies indicate a “close identification of the navy’s 
traditional goals with those of Hitler’s in the pre-war period, and as a result of the 
demands of total war, a growing ‘politicalization’ of the  navy.”121  
Despite Hitler’s desire to avoid a maritime conflict with Great Britain, his 
invasion of Poland incited Britain to declare war on Germany. Deist quotes the primary 
source Lagevotrage des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939–1945 
saying, “As far as the navy is concerned, it is of course by no means ready for the big war 
against Britain in the autumn of 1939 . . . The surface ships are so few and so weak 
compared with the British fleet that, even if fully committed, they would only be able to 
show that they know how to die with honor and are resolved in this way to lay the 
foundation for a new build-up later.”122 Once Hitler realized that avoiding conflict with 
England was impossible, he accepted the idea of attacking England’s supply lines. As it 
was becoming evident that the war would not be a short one, he also realized that ore 
shipments from Scandinavia would need to be secured in order to guarantee adequate 
resources for the Wehrmacht and the Kriegsmarine. In this way, the Kriegsmarine not 
only had to disrupt English seaborne communication, but also had to protect its own 
seaborne communications from Norway, where Swedish ore shipments were exported to 
Germany. To improve Germany’s geostrategic standing, Hitler, undertook operation 
Weserübung against Norway, thus securing his sea lines of communication and denying 
England the chance to gain influence over that region of the North Sea.123 Bird argues, 
“although the battleships, Bismarck and Tirpitz, symbolize the power of the German 
fleet, it was the U-boat in the two World Wars which proved to be the navy’s primary 
weapon and was considered in both to be a ‘war winner.’ ”124 The U-boats were quite 
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successful in accomplishing both of these tasks up until 1943, when allied anti-submarine 
capability rendered the U-boats more or less ineffective.  
By the end of WWII, Germany had discovered once again that any bid for world 
power perched on the legs of naval power was doomed to fail. Hitler’s Z-plan concept, an 
ambitious shipbuilding program that not only required too much time to be realized, but 
was also built upon a strategy that was not a good fit for the realities of German sea 
power, was not too much different that Tirpitz’s failed “risk theory” concept from the 
previous epoch. In the end, geographic realities prevailed and the German navy learned 
for a second time that it takes more than just naval equipment and men to build a strong 
maritime power. The reason England was able to command the seas had as much to do 
with the geographies of coastal access and positioning near the great lines of 
communication of the sea than anything else. Although Hitler was able to disrupt allied 
shipping for a time using the U-boat arm of the Kriegsmarine, this was inevitably merely 
a time-buying measure. Just as Kaiser Wilhelm II discovered with his failed bid for world 
power through maritime supremacy, Hitler too discovered that such ambitions were 
purely academic.  
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IV. GERMAN NAVY REDUX: EAST AND WEST AFTER 1955 
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, neither the victors nor the 
vanquished imagined a future scenario that portended a revival of German military or 
naval power. One of the stipulations of the unconditional surrender by Germany was 
permanent demilitarization along with denazification, democratization and 
decartelization.125 The Tripartite Naval Commission set about the task of dismantling 
what was left of the Kriegsmarine; its ships were split up among the three occupying 
powers, its personnel were civilianized, and its bases and facilities were dismantled, or 
taken over by the victors. Although some vestiges of the Kriegsmarine sailed on under 
civilian employment carrying out the daunting task of removing the hundreds of 
thousands of unexploded mines that dotted European coastlines following the war, 
staffing maritime police functions, enforcing customs, and even participating in 
intelligence gathering operations, the organizations responsible for these tasks had no 
institutional link with the Wehrmacht, which had ceased to exist as an institution in the 
spring of 1945.  
As the Cold War began to gather steam in the epoch 1948-9, and the existential 
threat of an expanding Soviet sphere of influence loomed large in the minds of Western 
leaders, plans for some form of West German rearmament within the context of Atlantic 
alliance collective defense began to emerge. Spurred on by the fear that the Korean war 
was a pattern for Europe in 1950, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s government in concert 
with the Western occupation leaders were undertaking preliminary work to lay the 
foundations for a new West German military, and a navy that could support Western 
multilateral alliance structures. In the East, the Soviets had already been covertly laying 
the groundwork for their own navy that would serve within the context of Warsaw Pact 
security systems. In the years 1955–56, the long process of preparation led to the advent 
of the German-German armies, and two new German navies emerged, the Bundesmarine 
in the West, and the Volksmarine in the East.  
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The two navies were raised along conflicting economic, political, and ideological 
lines. Despite sharing a common past, the ways in which the two navies connected with 
this past differed, resulting in a separate naval identity, esprit de corps, and political order 
to say nothing of conflicted concepts of naval tradition in the two different institutions. 
Strategy in the West centered on supporting NATO, and the role of the navy within state 
and society was that of a constitutionally founded armed institution within a democracy. 
In the East, although supporting the Soviet led Warsaw Pact alliance was part of the 
navy’s strategic purpose, its role within state and society was much different from in the 
West due to the communist system in which it resided. The following chapter takes a 
closer look at this lesser-known epoch of German naval history, specifically as pertains to 
the formation of two ideologically divergent naval institutions that served their states and 
societies in diametrically different ways.  
A. THE ROLE OF THE INTERMEDIARY NAVAL ORGANIZATIONS  
As a prelude to the navies of the 1950s, several intermediary maritime 
organizations existed in both Western and Soviet occupation zones following the war. 
Although these organizations employed former Kriegsmarine personnel, they were 
administered as civilian agencies and did not provide social or strategic linkages from the 
Kriegsmarine into the Bundesmarine and the Volksmarine. The period between 1945 and 
1955 was essentially a decade of discontinuity within the German naval experience as 
part of the security vacuum of the epoch in the post war era and the long haul of defense 
institution building that marked this time, but Peifer argues the maritime organizations in 
place during this period “reflected the beginning divergence between East and West 
German institutions,”126 and served to shape the political, strategic and operational 
character of the soon-to-be German navies.  
The maritime organization employed by the Western powers immediately 
following the war was the German Mine Sweeping Administration (GMSA). Led by a 
combined British and American staff headquartered on the St. Pauli Landing, Hamburg, 
the organization employed former Kriegsmarine equipment and personnel in the 
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clearance of mines around Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark, Holland, Western Germany, 
and Norway. Manning for the GMSA consisted of over 27,000 former Kriegsmarine 
officers and 840 vessels at its peak.127 Though administered by the occupation 
governments, the employment of former Kriegsmarine personnel and equipment raised 
suspicion and criticism from the Soviets, who saw this as counter to the Potsdam 
principles.128 To alleviate these concerns, the GMSA was disbanded in 1948 and 
replaced by the Cuxhaven Minesweeping Group, which carried on the task of sweeping 
Germany’s coasts for mines, but in a smaller capacity using equipment that belonged to 
the Royal Navy, and staffed by civilians (albeit, former Kriegsmarine officers in a 
civilian role).129 
The Cuxhaven Minesweeping Group was disbanded in 1951, at which point the 
U.S. Navy established three Labor Service Units (LSUs); the most significant of which 
was LSU (B) in Bremerhaven. LSU (B) not only continued the task of sweeping the 
North Sea and Baltic approaches of mines, but also more importantly provided a 
framework for the future establishment of the Bundesmarine. The Labor Service in the 
U.S. forces was a long-lived institution and a reservoir of ex-Wehrmacht personnel, as 
well as displaced persons in their number. Peifer points out that, in the epoch from 1950 
until about 1956 “off the record, U.S. naval officers admitted that the organization would 
be put at the disposal of the West German government once clarity emerged about the 
role of the Federal Republic in the European Defense Community and NATO.”130 
Gradually, the LSU (B) shifted from undertaking minesweeping duties, to training 
Germans in a broad spectrum of naval subjects to prepare them for the formation of a 
new German navy. Confiscated Kriegsmarine vessels were appropriated to the LSU, 
which would eventually be put under German command. The West German 
Seegrenzshutz (Maritime Border Guard) was concurrently patrolling the coastline and 
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inland waterways, staffed by civilian personnel but employing West German equipment 
and falling under West German command.131 Both the LSUs and the Seegrenzshutz 
would contribute to the formation of the Bundesmarine in 1955, and the progression from 
GMSA to Cuxhaven Minesweeping Group to LSU and Seegrenzshutz provided the soon-
to-be Bundesmarine with a small cadre of experienced former Kriegsmarine officers who 
were carried through the disarmament period by these civilian maritime organizations. 
A number of significant intelligence organizations contributed to the formation of 
the Bundesmarine as well by providing a pool of institutional knowledge and experienced 
personnel. The Klose group, for instance, employed refitted Kriegsmarine S-boats with 
German crew to collect intelligence deep behind the Iron Curtain in the Baltic.132 The 
famous Reinhard Gehlen Organization employed former Kriegsmarine officers in Army 
Intelligence and then CIA sponsored maritime intelligence gathering operations, and the 
Naval Historical Team (NHT)—which worked with the U.S. armed forces as a reservoir 
of former staff officers who went from imprisonment to collaborative labor—was 
instrumental to the planning process of building the Bundesmarine.133 Albeit indirectly, 
these intelligence services were where the first vestiges of a West German Naval 
institution took root. As David Snyder points out, “although the United States did derive 
practical benefits from the NHT and LSUs, it had a goal other than immediate 
exploitation: creating a pool of men and vessels that could be transformed swiftly into a 
West German naval force.”134 
In East Germany, the pre-runners to the Volksmarine began with the Volkspolizei 
that formed in the fall of 1945. The Soviets engaged in a process of creation and 
expansion of the Volkspolizei into a paramilitary and then regular army in the years from 
1948 until 1956, the latter more or less taking shape in the epoch 1952–1955. The 
establishment of the Hauptverwaltung der Seepolizei in 1950 came next, which then 
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became the Volkspolizei-See. This VP-See was primarily concerned with minesweeping 
and coastal defense, and like the LSUs and Seegrenzshutz in the West, was the breeding 
ground for an East German naval cadre.135 Peifer points out, “[w]hile the force had to be 
termed a ‘police’ organization for political reasons, its uniforms, training procedures, and 
regulations were to be devised along naval rather than police lines.”136 In this way, East 
Germany had essentially begun rearmament by another name directly after the war and 
not in response to the creation of a West German Navy in 1955, as was the socialist myth 
of the day that the East German forces were a riposte to the militarism and revanchism of 
the American led camp. Many of the standard coast guard duties were handled by 
Mecklenburg’s Maritime Security Police, which although tasked with police and customs 
duties in the inland waterways, did not initially poses any vessels. In the East German 
intermediary maritime organizations, and subsequently in the Volksmarine, selection 
criterion was based on an individual’s communist ideology, and key posts were filled 
only by devote communists from the SED (East Germany’s Socialist-Communist party). 
Peifer points out that few former Kriegsmarine officers were drawn to the SED, and 
consequently the preponderance of experienced Kriegsmarine officers ended up filling 
the ranks of the Bundesmarine, leaving the Volksmarine with a dearth of naval 
experience at its inception.137 
B. HERITAGE IN CONFLICT: THE CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL 
TRADITION IN EAST AND WEST 
Despite sharing a common history, East and West connected with their naval 
heritage in quite different ways. The Bundesmarine and the Volksmarine derived 
different lessons from their shared past and developed disparate narratives, fostering 
naval traditions that reflected the nature of the two ideologically divergent governments. 
Peifer argues “both Volks- and Bundesmarine reacted to a common German past, but 
interaction with the Western powers and the Soviet Union during the period 1945–1956 
resulted in two German navies formed along different principles and reflecting two 
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diverging German societies.”138 In developing a usable past, both East and West turned 
more so to sociopolitical anecdotes, and less so to tales of great battles or feats of derring-
do; a phenomenon that can be attributed to the fact that neither institution cared to glorify 
the Kriegsmarine or the others before it. Specific “memory beacons” (a term coined by 
Douglas Peifer but which is actually from Admiral Ruge) stick out in German Naval 
history as points of divergence between East and West. The naval mutinies of 1917–8, 
and the attempted coup against Hitler on the 20th of July 1944 are two prominent ones 
that demonstrate how interpretations of history reflected the political culture and order of 
the two Germanies in the cold war.139  
For the Volksmarine, writing a historical narrative centered around events that 
could be considered socialist, “progressive” or “revolutionary,” and thus tying together 
German and Soviet history along the common thread of the proletarian struggle by men 
and women at arms in the epoch from the 18th century until the 20th century. The 
mutinies of 1917 and the naval revolution of 1918 were identified as heroic examples of 
progressive Germans fighting against their imperial masters. As Peifer points out, “East 
German accounts equated mutinous sailors with communist revolutionaries, and 
emphasized how Germany’s Red sailors had acted out of class consciousness.”140 For the 
SED, this memory beacon served to legitimize the socialist state and its common legacy 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as well as the origins of 
communism in 1918–1919. The West identified with these events much differently, 
associating them with the defeat of the Empire and the negative aspects of communism. 
Western interpretations also tended to acknowledge the more pragmatic origins of the 
mutinies—Sailors revolting in response to poor living conditions, sparse rations, and 
ineffective leadership. East German interpretations glossed over such practical 
considerations, and placed much more emphasis on the role of class-consciousness and 
revolutionary ideology.  
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The 20th of July 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life, led by German colonels and 
civilians, unlike the mutinies of 1917–18, did not serve the SED’s revolutionary historical 
narrative in any useful way. The Soviets identified only with the fact that the attempted 
coup had failed, and that it was the Red Army that ultimately came in to topple the Nazi 
regime.141 This stood in contrast to the West, where the government found “enduring 
functional utility” in the event.142 Early interpretations by West Germany treated the 
conspirators of July 1944 as traitors, and gave an overall negative assessment of the 
ordeal—consistent with the anti-Wehrmacht rhetoric of the day. Once the FRG began 
rearmament, however, its leaders used those involved in the coup as examples of how the 
Wehrmacht had not been fully subverted by Nazi ideology.143 Peifer points out 
“[p]oliticians, journalists, and experts supporting rearmament could point to 
Stauffenberg, Beck and others as examples of Wehrmacht officers who had tried to 
uphold military codes of honor and patriotism.”144 There was great utility in changing 
negative public perceptions regarding the role the Wehrmacht and the Kriegsmarine 
played within Nazism and the Third Reich because once the time came to rearm; the 
western allies and the FRG had to draw on former officers from those ranks in order to 
construct a functioning military. Even to this day, the 20th of July serves to “link modern 
Germany and the Bundeswehr to a military past of which it can be proud.”145 To be sure, 
the continuities between the Volks- and Bundesmarine and the Reich- and Kriegsmarine 
before them were more pronounced in the West than they were in the East.  
The Volksmarine was a tool of the SED, as such the party could simply create 
whatever narrative it chose. Moreover, the Volksmarine viewed the Kriegsmarine as 
diametrically opposed to itself along political and ideological lines, and thus severed its 
connection with this precursor organization to a much greater degree than ultimately 
occurred in the West. The Bundesmarine on the other hand, due to its role as a 
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constitutionally founded institution within a democratic state, was required to incorporate 
a deal more realism into its historical narrative. The institution was faced with finding a 
usable past through a process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (reckoning with the past), 
and that involved embracing aspects of the Kriegsmarine and the others before it, 
fostering a healthy naval tradition among the officer corps, and repairing the damaged 
civil-military relationship brought on by past military excesses and adventurism. 
Abenheim argues, “soldiers still had a sense of their own honor and professional ethos 
despite all that had happened around them,”146 the task then was to somehow retain this 
sense of tradition and honor while rejecting the unfavorable historical bits. The 
Bundesmarine took great care in “selecting the appropriate traditions and military virtues 
from its past.”147 For the Volksmarine, identifying with the past simply meant inventing a 
narrative that supported progressive, revolutionary ideals while in some way linking 
German and Soviet histories together.  
C. THE ROLE OF NAVAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN STATE AND 
SOCIETY 
Even before the buildup of East and West German military capabilities, the 
occupation zones of the respective powers were diverging along political, economic, 
social, and ideological lines. Despite sharing a common origin, the Bundesmarine and the 
Volksmarine approached their ethos, their connection to the past, and their strategic 
purpose in different manners along these divergent lines. As Bird points out, “both the 
Bundesmarine and the Volksmarine became members of opposing military alliances in 
1955, NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively, and defined their strategic mission 
within the objectives established by these organizations.”148 One of the key concepts 
shared by both institutions was that of the “citizen in uniform,” but the two institutions 
had differing ideas of what it meant. For the FRG, the “citizen in uniform” represented 
the crowing achievement of a constitutionally founded military within a democracy—the 
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melding of state, society, and the military, and the parliamentary control over its 
employment. The “citizen in uniform” in West Germany, guided by the principle of 
Innere Führung, served to guarantee no military junta or caste could form by ensuring a 
close bond between the civil population and those in uniform. In the GDR, on the other 
hand, the “citizen in uniform” pertained to how “the NVA is to be the army of the Party 
(SED) and serve the aims of the SED.”149 In this way, the two governments took a very 
different view of the role of the navy and its service to the state. In the FRG, the military 
was integrated into society and the state, and was not merely a tool of the party as was the 
case in the GDR. 
1. Bundesmarine: A Navy Within a Democracy 
From the very start, the concept of a West German Navy centered on being built 
into a multilateral alliance framework. From the original (but ultimately stillborn) French 
idea of a supranational military force operating within an European Defense Community 
(EDC), to Germany’s accession into the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948 and 
ultimately the formation of the West German Navy within the command structure of 
NATO, the Bundesmarine has always existed within the context of a constitutionally 
founded institution, serving a democratic state, with an obligation to an alliance system. 
The Cold War, and NATO, provided West Germany with the opportunity to rearm and 
prove to its allies that it could be a responsible partner—but the process provided 
challenges for the new republic, as it demanded new forms of strategy and military 
practice that were not attempted in Germany’s first Republican adventure during the 
Weimar epoch. In its early years, the Bundesmarine was more concerned with finding its 
place within democratic society than it was with developing its combat effectiveness.150 
The 1949 Basic Law, especially articles 12a, 24, and 87a, “banned the waging of a war of 
aggression, made collective security through the United Nations (UN) the highest goal of 
statecraft, and limited the mission of the armed forces to defense.”151 This constitution, 
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taken together with the guiding principles of Innere Führung provided the needed 
framework and assurance against some replayed “stab in the back” scenario for the new 
Navy to exist in this as yet fragile democracy.152  
The concept of Innere Führung is central to the life of the armed forces in today’s 
Germany, and has been since its inception in 1953. Having no direct translation into 
English, Michael Lux succinctly defines it as meaning “that the soldier in democracy—
the citizen in uniform—must not serve or defend any regime, ruler, or ideology with 
unconditional obedience against the best of ones knowledge.”153 Broadly speaking, it is a 
leadership philosophy for the Bundeswehr, based on the values of the Basic Law, which 
was embedded from the start as an assurance to citizens both in and out of uniform that 
the past would not be repeated. The 2006 White Paper on German Security defines 
Innere Führung as “leadership development and civic education,” a definition shared by 
the 2009 Field Manual ZDv 10/1 on Innere Führung.154 This institution of command, 
obedience, morale, education, and soldiering in a democracy ensures that those who 
command and those who follow have mutual respect, and cultivates an educated military 
force that is aware of its past, its government, and its people. It has its origins in the 
problems FRG leaders faced in the early 1950s getting a divided nation that was opposed 
to the idea of rearmament to accept the idea of a new West German military, and ensured 
said military would never again become the “school of a nation.” As Lux points out, there 
was great danger “of a restoration of a military caste as an anti-democratic force, as well 
as bogus revival of military honor at the expense of pluralism was a real threat in the 
early 1950s.”155 
Wolf Graf von Baudissin, a leading figure in Innere Führung—and one of the 
pivotal planners for the West German Army—said in 1955 regarding his vision for the 
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armed forces: “Among so many spiritual changes and faltering values the German soldier 
must be given the feeling that he is a member of a free nation standing on the side of 
freedom.”156 This statement embodies the idea behind the storied concept of the “citizen 
in uniform,” which ultimately is the goal of Innere Führung. Before Innere Führung 
came into being, Baudissin used the term Innere Gefuege (inner structure) as a 
framework for building the new military in a young democracy. The planners in the early 
West German Ministry of Defense sought to devise an ethos within the future military 
that centered around what Baudissin identified as the three basic things needed to create a 
democratic armed force: “organic integration of the army into the democratic state; 
devotion of its leaders to the state and its constitution; identity of values in the army and 
in the democratic state.”157 This early conception of how the Bundeswehr would function 
within the new Republic was the foundation for the principle of Innere Führung that has 
been and still is the primary feature of the Bundeswehr. Baudissin envisioned Innere 
Führung as a way to “reconcile pluralism and liberal democracy with soldierly honor and 
service”158  
Up until recently, the Bundeswehr and the Bundesmarine within it have been a 
conscription force—an institution that the founders of the FRG saw as also assuring an 
integration of the soldier in state and society. Conscription, along with Innere Führung 
were key enablers of the “citizen in uniform” for the FRG. Baudissin acknowledged that 
military service “can rouse many young men to their first knowledge of what a system of 
human values and a community are all about.”159 Conscription was an about-face to the 
apolitical or anti-democratic “state within a state” Reichswehr system that was cultivated 
in the Weimar Republic and transformed by the Wehrmacht into an institution of 
National Socialism. Innere Führung gave every man (and later woman) serving a stake in 
his/her community, gave society a deeper understanding of who and what its martial 
forces were, and “offered a common identity and a sense of service to a just cause” to 
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those in uniform.160 Conscription, and consequently the “citizen in uniform,” helped to 
overcome the record of the solider under National Socialism. David Clay Large argues 
conscription served the vital function of countering the popular sentiment that in 
Germany “one could not have a military without militarism.”161 The Bundeswehr had to 
be a significant departure from the past martial institutions of Germany—Innere 
Führung, the “citizen in uniform,” and conscription were it.162 
Another key component of Innere Führung is the importance of superiors in 
educating their subordinates and setting a good example. The demands of technologically 
advanced naval systems demands that the enlisted men have highly specialized skills 
required for the operation of equipment, equipment that the leaders themselves do not 
poses the depth of knowledge required to operate. For this reason, it is the role of the 
leader to coordinate, and to provide civic and moral guidance. As such, Innere Führung 
has proved to be a useful philosophy for operating a modern, technologically advanced 
naval force. The Field Manual ZDv 10/1 defines the principles of Innere Führung as: 
Integration into state and society, the guiding principle of the ‘citizen in uniform,’ 
ethical, legal and political legitimacy of the mission, the realization of fundamental 
constitutional and social values in the armed forces, the limits of ‘orders and obedience,’ 
the application of the principle of mission command, the observance of the statutory 
participation rights of soldiers, and the observance of the freedom of association 
guaranteed in the Basic Law.163 
A prominent American scholar has argued “[f]rom the start, Innere Führung had 
to struggle with the primacy of politics, the need for military efficiency, and the burdens 
of history.”164 The leaders of the Federal Republic viewed the military as a “necessary 
evil,” but were resolved to make it a “democratic army in a democratic state” rather than 
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a state within a state as was the case in earlier iterations of a German military.165 Key 
among the questions facing the leaders of the new FRG included what were to be the 
martial duties of the citizen, what would be the role of naval institutions within 
democracy, and what were the ethical limits of command—all of which were rolled into 
the guiding principles of Innere Führung. 
2. Volksmarine: A Navy As an Instrument of the Party 
With a bill passed by GDR’s parliament in January 1956, the National People’s 
Army—and subsequently the Naval Forces of the National People’s Army (renamed the 
Volksmarine in 1960)—was called into being so that East Germany could fulfill its 
military obligations to the Warsaw Pact. The Volksmarine had a closer integration with 
the Warsaw Pact than the Bundesmarine did with NATO, due to the nature of the Soviet 
system and the fact that the Soviet Navy exercised a “de facto degree of control under the 
guise of advice and assistance” over the Volksmarine.166 One must only look to the 
official slogan of the Volksmarine to understand the extent of which it was a slave to the 
Soviet system: “To learn from the Soviet Union is to learn how to win.”167 Further, naval 
ships serving the GDR flew not the GDR national flag, but rather the communist red 
banner as their ensign.168 The Volksmarine was more politicized than the Kriegsmarine 
under National Socialism had ever been. The officer corps of the Volksmarine was 
nothing more than a “bastion of SED dominance.”169 Peifer argues that “while the East 
German navy drew upon a number of Kriegsmarine personnel, traditions, and procedures, 
the discontinuities between East Germany’s navy and the Reichs- and Kriegsmarine far 
outweighed the continuities.”170 However, in the early years, the Volksmarine for sure 
displayed German characteristics, by the mid-1960s any vestiges of the Kriegsmarine has 
more or less been displaced by Soviet influence.  
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D. NAVAL STRATEGY AND THE COLD WAR 
As previously stated, the geopolitical confrontation of the Cold War and its 
resulting order of battle in Eurasia drove German rearmament on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain. More so than merely defining the shape and character of the two new naval 
institutions, the Cold War also drove strategic developments. Under the aegis of NATO 
in the West and the Warsaw Pact in the East, the navies of the two Germanies developed 
strategies that took on the character of the decade’s long stalemate between the Western 
powers and the USSR. For the Bundesmarine, its naval strategy was more or less 
synonymous with NATOs naval strategy—which has “traditionally been characterized as 
defensive (‘containing’) and ancillary to the balance of NATO’s ‘Central Front.’”171 As 
Bird argues, “it is impossible to understand the growth and development of the 
Bundesmarine without reference to NATO and West Germany’s involvement in the 
evolution of this alliance.”172 Although the Bundesmarine for sure was a component of 
the FRG’s sovereign military forces, it fell directly under the operational command of the 
NATO Northern Europe Command based in Norway, and did not receive its orders from 
the Defense Ministry in Bonn.  
Until the 1970s, the Bundesmarine’s official NATO mandates were to maintain 
freedom of navigation in the Baltic littorals during peacetime, and defend the Baltic 
approaches, shipping, and sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in time of war.173 The 
Navy provided a layered defense of a coastal area that ran from the northern tip of 
Norway down to Schleswig-Holstein, with surface ships on patrol in the littorals and 
approaches, and maritime patrol aircraft extending deeper into the Baltic.174 These forces 
fell under the Allied Forces, Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) tri-service headquarters in 
Karup, Denmark, and defended the key Baltic exit routes (straits of the Sound, Great 
Belt, and Little Sea).175 This role later expanded into the so-called “Northern Flank” of 
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the Norwegian Sea. As Richard Hooker points out, if the Soviet’s Red Banner Fleet 
gained control of the strategic Northern Flank, it would enable them “to exert pressure, in 
the form of air attacks, amphibious landings, and even conventional ground attacks, in 
support of operations in the Baltic, the Low Countries, and the North German Plain.”176 
In addition to providing presence to counter a potential Soviet amphibious operation in 
the Baltic, the Bundesmarine was instrumental in conducting Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW) patrols to deter the growing number of Soviet ballistic missile carrying nuclear 
submarines (SSBNs) that were present. Until the 1970s, the Northern Flank fell to the 
other Atlantic alliance partners to patrol and defend, but as the Warsaw Pact presence in 
the North grew, so too did the demand for the Bundesmarine to move out of the Baltic 
littorals and into the “blue water” domain of the North Sea. This shift was really just a 
first step in an ongoing process of role expansion that is still occurring within the German 
Navy today.  
Although the 1954 Paris Agreements placed limits on the initial size of the 
Bundesmarine, NATO requirements led to revision and expansion of those limits. 
Especially after the Cuban missile crisis, NATO maritime focus shifted toward 
countering the potential threat of a large-scale Soviet amphibious operation in the Baltic 
exits. This called for the Bundesmarine to expand beyond the littorals and become more 
of a “blue water” navy. The early Bundesmarine fleet was made up mostly of WWII era 
Mine Counter Measures (MCMs) and Kriegsfischkutters (Cutters from the former 
Kriegsmarine), and donated vessels from the other alliance partners.177 Once the West 
German shipbuilding industry regained its footing in the early 1960s, organic West 
German ships, such as the Raubmöve class fast patrol boats and the F-120 Köln class 
frigates, began to populate the fleet.178 By 1964, the Bundesmarine contributed 14 
squadrons of surface, subsurface, and airborne assets (256 craft in totality) to NATO.179 
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With expanded roles for the Bundesmarine, the U.S. turned over a number of the more 
modern Fletcher class destroyers to provide the Bundesmarine with a robust ASW 
capability, and this growing fleet was tasked with the mission to detect, identify, and 
engage Warsaw Pact vessels, to lay and counter sea mines if required, to patrol 
Germany’s coastal waters, and to defend against a potential large-scale enemy 
amphibious landing operation in the Baltic exits.180 The Frigatte 122 class, the first of 
which was the Bremen, was incorporated into the Bundesmarine in 1982 to provide it 
with a technologically advanced capability. Throughout the Cold War, the Bundesmarine 
participated in multilateral naval groups, such as NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic 
(STANAVFORLANT), Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), and 
Multilateral Force (MLF), demonstrating its role as a responsible alliance power 
supporting multilateral collective security systems.181 Rahn posed that “for the first time 
in her history she [The Bundesmarine] was obliged merely to perform that function 
‘which a German Navy can actually perform’ (D. Hartwig) in close cooperation with 
maritime powers.”182 That is to say, after two failed bids for World Power, the German 
Navy finally found a maritime strategy appropriate for a middle European power.  
By the 1980s, political changes allowed the Bundesmarine to shift focus away 
from the Baltic and NATOs Northern Flank, and prepare for “a broader spectrum of 
maritime defense missions and tasks which were distant from German coastal waters.”183 
This, of course, came with popular backlash. Deployments, such as the 1980 destroyer 
cruise in the Indian Ocean, were viewed with skepticism, as it fell far outside what could 
be considered West Germany or NATO’s immediate sphere of security interest. This 
marked the beginning transformation of the German Navy from a Cold War era escort 
force toward the contemporary expeditionary force manifest in the German Navy today—
a topic that will be explored in more depth in the following chapter.  
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V. THE MODERN GERMAN NAVY: AN ALLIANCE POWER 
The end of the Cold war and the collapse of communism in the era 1989–1991 
brought not only the unexpected unification of the two Germanies, but a paradigm shift to 
new missions and strategic roles for the newly unified German Navy. The first of these 
surprises was the integration of the legacy of the East German Navy into that of a 
Bundeswehr in German unity, a contingency no one had anticipated twenty-four months 
prior to October 1990. While the challenges associated with incorporating the personnel, 
ethos, heritage, and equipment of the former Volksmarine into the structure of the 
Federal German Navy cannot be overstated, the process was rife with political hurdles as 
well. Stefan Nitschke argues, under the then heading of “out of area,” the political 
changes associated with the fall of the USSR meant “[t]he Navy’s premier task shifted 
from defending against a tangible Warsaw Pact threat to preparing for a broader spectrum 
of maritime defense missions and tasks which were distant from German coastal 
waters.”184 Although the Bundesmarine (renamed the Deutsche Marine in 2005—herein 
referred to as the German Navy) has remained on course with its legacy of operating 
within multilateral alliance collective security frameworks, new global challenges and a 
changed strategic environment in the past quarter of a century call for transformation and 
reform to meet new responsibilities in areas that had at one time been viewed as 
constitutionally banned. The security environment in the 21st century calls for a leaner 
force postured to support a wide range of operations ranging from crisis response and 
humanitarian assistance to embargo enforcement and countering transnational threats far 
beyond Germany’s immediate periphery. For the Federal Republic, with its unhappy 
experience of modern war and its reticence to use the military in a casual fashion as an 
instrument of policy, this transformation of the Bundeswehr and the navy within it has 
been anything other than routine or simple. This being said, the German Navy of today 
fulfills its role commensurate to the relative strength of the German Republic  
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within the European system of states and does so with exemplary efficiency and with a 
single mindedness of purpose that belies the popular image of Germany as a “pacifist” 
nation in a state of disarmament.  
A. UNIFICATION 
The two Germanies were unified on October 3, 1990, and with unification the 
Navy was faced with the immediate task of absorbing the vestiges of the former GDR’s 
Volksmarine. Due to existing plans to downsize the West German Navy (the Navy 2005 
plan that was drafted during the Cold War), the decision was made from the start that no 
vessels from the Volksmarine would be adopted by the new German Navy. Personnel 
from the East German ranks were selected very carefully and in small quantity. They 
were given a probationary period after which most were then gradually released from 
service, not the least because of the legacy of the GDR communist system in the ranks of 
the forces. Commander Jürgen Ehle recounts the long list of Volksmarine personnel and 
equipment that the new German Navy had to decommission: “8,300 military personnel 
(of a former total of fourteen thousand in October 1989) and 3,700 civilian employees; 
129 facilities (headquarters, naval bases, depots, etc.); seventy-one combat vessels, forty-
six auxiliary ships, and twenty-seven helicopters; forty-three thousand handheld firearms 
and fourteen thousand tons of ammunition; seventy-eight main battle tanks and armored 
infantry vehicles, 177 reconnaissance tanks, and 5,500 motor vehicles; 1800 tons of 
highly toxic rocket fuel; and clothing stocks for about 200,000 men and women.”185 
Although much of what composed the former Volksmarine was not repurposed within the 
German Navy, that did not change the fact that the navy’s area of cognizance now 
included the coastlines of the former GDR. 
Peifer points out the West German Ministry of Defense having struggled with the 
legacy of national socialism in the Wehrmacht as well as being home to a fairly normal 
and not unhealthy anti communism into which it was born, dictated the NVA formed no 
source of tradition in the Bundeswehr in unity, despite the integration of the ex-NVA 
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officers and troops, and said, further, the MoD “showed little interest in integrating GDR 
icons into its traditions,” and the unification of the two Germanies was “the end of an era 
in which German naval mutinies served as a memory beacon and symbol.”186 East 
Germany’s revolutionary historical narrative had no place in the post 1990 navy. 
Moreover, the enduring utility of the 20th of July proved useful again in the education of 
the former Volksmarine personnel as they were introduced to Innere Führung. 
The key characteristics of the newly unified Navy were parliamentary control 
over the forces as an army of parliament, and a navy of parliament, too and “an aversion 
to ‘interventionism.’ ”187 The reliance on NATO as the primary instrument for European 
defense during the Cold War, and German public opinion cultivated what Ronald Asmus 
called a “culture of reticence” in Germany—which is to say, one not quite pacifist, but 
reluctant to use armed force unlike in the U.S., the U.K. or France.188 The united 
Germany’s first two Chancellors, Helmut Kohl, and Gerhard Schröder, and now Angela 
Merkel, all have realized Germany’s responsibility to expand its role in global operations 
and provide military forces to alliance security systems commensurate to the economic 
and physical size of Germany, even if this policy remains unpopular and no object of 
celebration as is the case elsewhere. As Susanne Koelbl points out, “[w]ith reunification, 
the nation had not just regained full sovereignty: it also became subject to the rules that 
had effectively been put on ice during the Cold War.”189 Germany, virtually overnight, 
went from being a divided Cold War nation to a strong European power with expected 
proportionate security contributions.  
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B. FROM ESCORT FORCE TO EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 
Germany’s naval roles in the Cold War were essentially restricted to Central 
Europe and were focused on countering the Soviet threat in the Baltic and the North Sea. 
The changed strategic environment following the collapse of communism presented new 
challenges for the united navy. Instability in the Balkans called for NATO and UN 
intervention, piracy off of the Horn of Africa became prolific and has posed a threat to 
German and other allied commerce, the 9/11 terrorist attacks sparked a global war on 
terror that required a multilateral approach; all of these events are just part of the 
increasingly globalized world where national interests are increasingly becoming 
intertwined with transnational problems. In its early years, the German Navy was faced 
with mounting pressure from its international partners to expand its mandates and 
participate unrestricted in multilateral operations in areas outside of NATO’s immediate 
territory.  
Germany’s 2006 White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr defines German security policy as “forward-looking and multilateral,” and 
proclaims that “[t]he strategic partnership between NATO and the EU is one of the pillars 
of the European and transatlantic security architecture.”190 This statement is paramount 
to understanding Germany’s basic idea for providing security for itself and for its 
partners. German security interests are intertwined with EU and NATO security interests, 
and a priority is minimizing the duplication of efforts between these two institutions. 
Regarding NATO specifically, the White Paper identifies it as “[t]he bedrock of common 
security and Germany and Europe. It is the backbone of the North Atlantic Alliance, 
which in turn is the cornerstone of German security and defense policy.”191 The White 
Paper identifies the UN as “the fundamental framework of international law that governs 
international relations.”192 This conclusion was a landmark occasion for the 
Bundesmarine, for it marked the beginning of a shift from being a purely coastal and 
escort based force, to an expeditionary one that could support operations that had 
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previously been considered outside the scope of German security interests. This shift 
toward “out of area” missions saw an expansion in the years following the September 11 
attacks, following the tide of understanding that transnational threats such as terrorism 
mean that German security interests extend beyond Germany’s shores and thus as a 
responsible and powerful country in the region, Germany must provide forces 
commensurate to their geographic and economic weight within the alliance frameworks. 
1. 1994 Constitutional Court Ruling 
The writing of the German Basic Law in 1949 made only allowance for 
association with a collective security organization, that is, the UN, and contained no 
national security provisions. The latter were drafted amid controversy in the mid 1950s, 
but placed an ironclad limit of national defense in the strictest sense on the mission of the 
Bundeswehr. This constitutional core principle became an impediment to the making of 
policy in the chaos of the 1990s, and eventually, Parliament compelled the Judiciary 
more or less to revise the constitution. As the ex Yugoslav war deepened in its horror and 
the U.S. and NATO reoriented themselves in the wake of the ’90–’91 Gulf War, on July 
12, 1994 the constitutional court in Karlsruhe put forth a ruling resulting in a changed 
interpretation: that no legal bar on the use of German armed forces abroad—in support of 
UN, NATO, or other collective security initiatives—actually existed. While this new 
interpretation of the Basic Law allowed for more leniencies regarding the deployment of 
German forces in out-of-area operations, it came with the stipulation that each 
deployment would be subject to Bundestag review and approval on a per-case basis.193 
Karl-Heinz Börner points out previous restrictive interpretations of the Basic Law 
“regarded as unconstitutional any international missions by German armed forces 
exceeding common self-defense within the geographical areas defined by NATO or the 
Western European Union (WEU),”194 so this ruling represented a major shift in 
operational capabilities for the Bundeswehr and the German Navy within it.  
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Basil Germond and Michael Smith point out that German doctrine is shifting to 
match the new emphasis on interventionist missions, citing documents like the 2003 
Zielvereinbarung fur die Deutsche Marine that state, “Beyond the traditional assets of the 
Navy in coastal waters, adjacent waters, and the high seas (the Escort Navy), the capacity 
is developing to carry out in priority enduring operations very remote from the adjacent 
waters within the framework of various threat scenarios (the Expeditionary Navy).”195 
German public opinion for out of area military operations has been a mixed bag, as there 
are those that believe participation in NATO operations away from German shores are 
more in the interest of pleasing the United States than in providing security benefits for 
Germany.196 On the other hand, since reunification, public opinion of expanded military 
responsibilities has certainly increased. 
2. Expanding Roles in Support of Alliance Partners 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the road to this revised interpretation of the 
Basic Law began prior to unification as the international community began to place 
demands on the German Navy that pushed it first out of the Baltic and into the North Sea, 
and eventually into the Eastern Mediterranean. The 1990 Gulf War brought increased 
pressure from the international community for Germany to pull its weight financially and 
militarily through UN peacekeeping missions; then Chancellor Helmut Kohl recognized 
“[w]e [Germany] have to face up to our responsibility, whether we like it or not.”197 A 
united Germany did pay many of the bills in 1990–1991, but was restricted from all out 
participation in that Gulf campaign by custom, by Soviet pressure, and by the lack of 
forces suited to the role. Although Germany was constitutionally barred from 
participating in the war itself, the German Navy aided in the cleanup of mines following 
the war with a contribution of five minesweepers, augmenting a capability that the US 
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had a noted lack of experience with.198 Then commander of American naval forces in the 
gulf, Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur, stated, “[m]ine warfare has never been one of our big 
priorities, because we’ve always assumed that other nations would take on that 
mission.”199 The deployment of these five German minesweepers to an area outside of 
Germany’s immediate periphery was a first for the newly unified German Navy, and 
demonstrated how German strengths could augment allied weaknesses. 
Koelbl mentions the process of breaking the taboo of “out of area” with the May 
1992 Bundeswehr operation in Cambodia, where German troops established a field 
hospital to aid victims of the Khmer Rouge. This was another major milestone for the 
shift toward becoming an expeditionary force. She argues that “[f]rom then on the 
German forces took on even bigger and more perilous assignments. But they were 
parceled out in such small doses that the German population accepted them.”200 Just later 
that year, the focus shifted to the Yugoslav catastrophe, as German naval units from 
STANAVFORLANT deployed in support of NATO Operation Maritime Monitor 
established off the coast of Montenegro, in support of UNSCRs 713 (calling for a cease 
fire in Yugoslavia) and 757 (calling for a reinforcement of the arms embargo put in place 
with UNSCR 752).201 Those German naval forces then supported “stop and search” 
operations off the coast of Montenegro/Serbia as part of the more aggressive Maritime 
Guard operation that replaced the monitoring one. Some criticism of the German Navy’s 
role in Maritime Guard arose because due to the constitutional ban on the use of force, 
Germany’s ships did not actively participate in the boardings, which was perceived as 
Germany taking “mere bystander’s attitude.”202 
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Support of the 1994 UN Operation Southern Cross in Somalia not only brought 
naval units far outside of German waters, but also presented the navy with the 
opportunity for its first joint operation in a more or less expeditionary role. Participation 
in NATO’s Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia from 1993–5, the 1996 exercise Baltic 
Sweep in the Gulf of Riga assisting Latvia with development of its own MCM force, the 
contribution of German ships from STANAVFORMED and STANAVFORLANT to the 
1999 Operation Allied Force over Serbia, and the employment of over 8,000 German 
troops to the UN Kosovo Force (KFOR) stability operation following conflict there in 
2000 and the continuing naval intelligence gathering mission in support of KFOR all are 
part of a trend whereby expeditionary operations have become the norm for German 
armed forces.203  
Germany’s support in 2006 of the UNSCR 1701 mandated cease-fire between 
Israel and Lebanon, which entailed naval patrols along the Lebanese coastline, brought a 
historic number of German military members serving in an out-of-area mission in the 
postwar era. Of the approximately 10,000 Bundeswehr personnel supporting the UN 
mandate, 1,500 were from the German Navy. Two frigates with organic helicopters, two 
supply ships and four fast patrol boats supported the combined multilateral maritime task 
force.204 This is all part of a larger trend of expeditionary ops, which in 2006, Chancellor 
Angela Merkel publicly stated that Germany “has to meet more obligations and take on 
more responsibility in the world.”205  
Germany provides forces to NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Groups (SNMGs) 
in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. These squadrons are typically composed 
of six to 10 vessels from NATO nations, but composition is rotational and varies every 
four to six months. The groups provide ready forces for intervention as necessary in 
Europe’s waters.206 The German Navy also contributes naval escorts to EU NAVFOR 
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(aka Operation Atlanta), an ongoing CSDP mission tasked with combatting piracy off the 
Horn of Africa. Germany’s decision to participate in counter-piracy operations through 
the EU-led NAVOFR rather than the NATO led Ocean Shield shows “domestic political 
preference for an EU option rather than yet another controversial US-led operation.”207 
As of 2009, Germany’s contribution to EU NAVFOR consisted of two frigates, one oil 
tanker, and one maritime patrol craft, which was roughly equal to France, Sweden, and 
Spain’s contributions.208 Germany is also a force provider for NATO’s Operation Active 
Endeavour—a standing counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean that was 
established following the 9/11 attacks,209 and provides surface assets to the Mine-
Countermeasure Force Mediterranean (MCMFORMED) as part of NATO’s Immediate 
Reaction Force (IRF).210 Clearly, the German Navy has grown immensely from the Cold 
War escort force confined to the Baltic and the Norwegian Sea and has demonstrated 
Germany’s willingness to take on roles commensurate to its heft within the European 
system. 
C. DEFENSE REFORM IN THE RECENT PAST AND THE FUTURE 
Key components of military reform in Germany have been the suspension of 
conscription, and the reorganization of the ministry of defense and the military command 
structure to fit more succinctly within European and transatlantic security forces as well 
as reduce the size of the forces amid a period of austerity. Abenheim points out a 
common misconception in Western circles has been that German defense institutions are 
“insufficient in size and resources for a nation of Germany’s strength and world role,” an 
opinion that he argues “misses the whole point of German defense institutional reform 
since the end of the Cold War, the rise of the European Union (EU), and the advent of 
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global alliance/coalitional warfare and crisis intervention.”211 Given Germany’s 
relationship with its storied history and a certain skepticism of the military induced by a 
once incredibly fractured civil-military relationship, the incremental expansion of the 
German Navy’s strategic role in supporting European collective security has far exceeded 
what was to be expected just 20 years ago. The Federal German Republic’s approach to 
foreign relations has always placed more emphasis on statecraft and multilateralism over 
raw military capability, as such military reform comes attached with a level of domestic 
battles to be fought.  
One major change as part of recent defense reforms is the suspension of 
conscription that went into effect in July of 2011. Until recently, conscription in Germany 
had been considered “an untouchable pillar of democracy,” or “democracy’s legitimate 
child.”212 Conscription in Germany was always tied to the concept of the “citizen in 
uniform,” and a major component of the guiding principle of Innere Führung that is so 
central to the life of the forces in Germany. Abenheim, an expert on the subject, argues 
“universal conscription has been the bedrock under the ‘citizen in uniform’ since the 
1950s . . . [t]o scrap this feature of service . . . cuts deeply to the core values in the 
political and strategic culture.”213 As previously discussed, conscription was built into the 
Bundeswehr from the start to ensure a durable link between solider and society and to 
prevent a militant “state within a state” from forming, but Stephan Pfaffenzeller argues 
“today’s soldiers are not subject to the same split loyalties as the Wehrmacht, nor do they 
find themselves in a similar situation of political instability.”214 
This decision to become a professional force was two fold. On the one hand, it 
more closely aligns Germany with its European partners who all maintain professional 
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militaries. On the other, it is part of downsizing efforts that aim to reduce the 
Bundeswehr from 240,000 to 170,000 (a far cry from the 500,000 plus Cold War size).215 
The 2010 panel on defense reform, lead by Dr. Frank-Jürgen Weise, head of the German 
Federal Labor Agency, called for a doubling of operational forces and a massive 
reduction in rear-echelon manning which was to shape the Bundeswehr more 
appropriately for its new expeditionary roles.216 The downsizing of the force is part of the 
streamlining process as the German Military continues its shift away from Cold War era 
strategic roles toward compact out-of-area deployments in support of multilateral 
coalition operations. Although conscription has been so ingrained in the military culture 
of Germany since 1955, public opinion of its suspension was mostly positive because 
there are many who feel it placed unnecessary burdens on Germany’s young adults. That 
is not to say that suspension did not have its critics. Some argue that by abolishing 
conscription, the German military will have to compete against universities and lucrative 
private sector jobs for their recruitment pool, and if the military loses out, then the 
Bundeswehr will suffer for lack of quality professional personnel. Nicolas Barotte cites a 
Der Spiegel article printed in 2000 that quoted then Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping 
as suggesting “only Rambos, rightists, and idiots” would volunteer to serve in the armed 
forces, an opinion that has obviously been overcome by events but demonstrates how far 
Germany has come in the past ten years with defense reform.217  
Congressional analyst Paul Belkin contends “Germany appears to continue to 
seek a ‘middle path’ between NATO and the EU, promoting the development of an 
independent European foreign and defense policy as a compliment, rather than 
counterweight to NATO.”218 Germany’s foreign policy preference is to operate through 
multilateral frameworks such as the EU, NATO, and especially the UN. For Germany, 
the UN is an essential institution. The expansion of German security interests beyond 
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NATO and into UN and CSDP missions has sparked domestic debate in Germany. Der 
Spiegel journalist Ulrike Demmer points out how German Minister of Defense Thomas 
de Maizière “often mentions Germany’s ‘fear of its own strength,’ which, as he says, was 
a welcome excuse for the Germans’ tendency to hold back on important issues after 
reunification, especially ‘when it was time to make their own concrete contributions to 
security policy.’ ”219 With its central and powerful role in Europe, Berlin has an active 
role to play in steering the direction of alliance collective security systems. This role does 
not only include NATO, but means supporting the Petersburg Tasks established by the St 
Malo Accords in support of CSDP initiatives, and UN operations. 
The German Navy today is a compact force postured to operate closely alongside 
alliance partners in peacetime through regular exercises and ongoing maritime operations 
combatting transnational issues such as terrorism and piracy. Operationally, its primary 
tasks are crisis response, although ASW remains one of its core competencies. Current 
fleet disposition is 19,197 personnel, 15 frigates, two corvettes, four Hunter-Killer 
submarines, 10 missile-armed Fast Attack Craft, two landing craft, 19 mine warfare 
vessels, eight tenders, one anti-submarine warfare/maritime patrol squadron, one 
maritime support helicopter squadron, one rotary anti-submarine warfare squadron.220 
This order of battle is an appropriate size for a continental middle power supporting 
alliance collective security initiatives whose “place in the world is characterized above all 
by our interests as a strong nation in the center of Europe and by out international 
responsibility for peace and freedom.”221 
                                                
219 Ulrike Demmer and Christoph Schult, “Germany’s Reputation in NATO Has Hit Rock Bottom,” 
Der Spiegel, May 5, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/criticism-of-germany-s-military-role-
in-the-nato-alliance-a-833503.html. 
220 Business Source Complete, “Germany Defence & Security Report.” Germany Defence & Security 
Report no. 1 (1st Quarter 2013): 37. 
221 German Ministry of Defense, “Defense Policy Guidelines,” May 18, 2011, 3, 
http://www.nato.diplo.de/contentblob/3150944/Daten/1318881/VM_deMaiziere_180511_eng_DLD.pdf. 
 79 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study analyzed the politics and strategy of the German Navy throughout its 
history, from inception to the present. Germany has a rich naval history and tradition to 
be sure. Its navy today is a prominent feature of the German armed forces, yet in many 
ways, it no longer bulks large as an immediate concern of the U.S. Navy or of defense 
experts in Washington, D.C. Such a view, however, is misguided, for the fate of Germany 
and its military is always a worthwhile inquiry. This officer’s goal has been to understand 
issues that are prone to misunderstanding, especially in the realm of strategy and policy, 
as well as civil military relations, which are always linked to the former. The significance 
of this study is in its exploration of the bare bones of strategy and warfare dissected in a 
vacuum, unhindered by narrow operational tales of feats in battle. This study has also set 
its sights on the imponderable features of self-purpose, tradition, morale, and strategy that 
are at the heart of navies, as found in the common threads woven through the various 
epochs of the German naval experience. The link between statecraft, national policy, and 
naval strategy cannot be overstated, to say nothing of the role modern society—however 
diffuse and confusing in its variety from the 18th century until the present—has to play in 
the proper functioning of a navy. This author selected the German case study to explore 
the origins of fleets and strategy because in its brief 150-year history, the navies of 
Germany have experienced both failures and successes in connection with a spectrum of 
statecraft spanning from Weltpolitik and Weltmachtstreben to supporting alliance 
collective security initiatives. The German Navy of today is the product of rebirth and a 
demonstration that when paired with democratic and multilaterally focused statecraft, it 
can be a powerful and effective apparatus.  
Despite the dreams of its founders and the delusions that gripped much of its 
development in the 19th and 20th centuries, Germany was never destined to be one of the 
great maritime powers; its geographic position, and the continental focus of German 
statecraft precludes such a thing. During Imperial Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm’s attempt at 
navalism in support of his ambitious foreign policy was met with failure because of a 
mismatch between strategy and politics. Materially, the High Seas Fleet at the onset of 
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WWI was impressive and technologically advanced, but the Kaiser built this navy 
without developing a strategy for its employment. He was drawn to the Mahanian 
concept of sea power, and he ultimately abandoned the Jeune École strategy that was a 
much better fit for Germany—the inferior naval power when ranked against Great 
Britain. Despite all of the time and money that went into constructing his fleet of 
dreadnaughts, this fleet spent the war hauled up in port under orders to remain there—a 
decision with catastrophic political consequences. Although the Kaiserliche Marine was 
successful in disrupting allied shipping through unrestricted submarine warfare, U-boats 
were viewed as ancillary to the battle fleet, and the successes of the U-boat arm were 
downplayed even in the strategic review following the war. The U-boat campaign 
brought the entry of the United States into the war, adding enough strength to the 
exhausted Entente powers and spelling the end of the second Reich and the disgrace of 
the Imperial Navy.  
The Reichsmarine of the Weimar Republic justified its existence by promoting 
the idea of a German blue water ethos as part of a reversal of the defeat and a return to 
great power, that is, world power in a dream of tomorrow. Despite its inaction in the war, 
the historians of the High Seas Fleet at work on their accounts of the immediate past 
aggrandized what deserved censure, and its failures of policy and strategy were glossed 
over in the glowing accounts published officially in the 1920s and the 1930s. Any 
dissenting opinions that suggested the strategic blunders of the Kaiserliche Marine’s 
concept of navalism were silenced in the civil military relations of Weimar that betrayed 
the incapacity of the first German democracy to find a path ahead with armed forces that 
made sense, instead of degraded into delusions. In order to guarantee a future for the then 
fragile navy, it was necessary to justify the past with windy claims about bravery and 
power. Tirpitz was dead set on reconstructing a blue water navy for Germany, but the 
impoverishment of strategic thinking incited by the incessant justification of a failed 
naval strategy doomed Germany to repeat the same mistakes all over again. 
Although Tirpitz’s naval ambitions were misguided, his feats in raising the first 
German fleet demonstrated an uncanny understanding of the role of mass politics in 
constructing a navy in the industrial and imperial age. Prior to his rise to head of the 
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Imperial Naval Office, naval planning in the Reich was myopic and unguided. Tirpitz 
was able to cement a vision for the German fleet, sell it to the Reichstag, and thus, secure 
the vast funds required in constructing technologically advanced naval equipment. 
Because of the long timeframes and big budgets required to raise a fleet, Tirpitz 
understood also that success hinged upon a national ethos of navalism. He used 
propaganda to sell the idea of Germany as a great maritime power to the public, thus 
establishing a strong civil military relationship that precluded socialist rebellions by the 
working class and ensured national support for the large percentage of the national 
economy that was required to undertake his naval construction plans. In this connection, 
the raising of a fleet requires a symbiosis of economic, political, social, and strategic 
factors. 
The civil military relationship during the Weimar epoch was damaged by the 
failures of the navy in the war, the mutinies and naval revolution of 1917–8, and the 
navy’s involvement in the 1920 putsch. The public did not trust the navy, and the navy 
adopted an apolitical ethos that established the cadre as a “state within a state” in the 
Republic. Raeder, like Tirpitz before him, understood that long-term ship construction 
policies in time of peace are vital to the success of fleets in time of war. It was he who 
said, “[u]nder certain circumstances political constellations can change more rapidly than 
ships can be built.”222 Because of this interplay between politics and fleet building, it is 
impossible to separate politics from naval strategy. Hitler’s world ambition became the 
Kriegsmarine’s world ambition during WWII. He transformed the “state within a state” 
of the military into an instrument of politics under National Socialism. By the end of 
WWII, what resulted was a public that was deeply skeptical of the military, a sentiment 
that took decades to repair through the integration of civil society and the military via the 
“citizen in uniform” and the military’s guiding principles of innere führung. 
Germany was unprepared for both world wars because of an inability in both 
cases to come to a consensus on the direction which fleet construction should take in time 
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to build up the fleet. Guerre de course was a strategic fit for Germany, but twice it was 
forgone in pursuit of an unrealistic offensive strategy modeled after Mahan’s sea power 
theories. The Reichsmarine attributed its failures in WWI to the revolutions and mutinies 
of 1918 and bad statecraft rather than to the realities of Germany’s geostrategic position 
and British sea power that decimated the inferior German Navy. Despite the successes of 
the U-boat campaign in WWI, its lessons were not applied from the start in WWII. 
Hitler’s naval build-up focused once again on the construction of a battle fleet as 
predicated by the Z-plan, but with the changed strategy of employing battleships against 
commerce. Although Grand Admiral Dönitz espoused unrestricted submarine warfare 
from the start, Hitler was reluctant to pursue any provocative strategy that would bring 
Great Britain into the war. Great Britain joined the war regardless, and Hitler’s late 
embarkation on a U-boat war against allied shipping served only to draw America into 
the war and seal the fate of the Kriegsmarine. By the end of WWII, Germany had learned 
once again that any attempt at world power perched on the legs of navalism was doomed 
to failure. Great Britain and the U.S.’s ability to command the seas, and Hitler’s inability 
too, stemmed as much from geography as it did from any other factor.  
In the Cold War, an epoch that stretched out over time to dwarf the record of war 
in 1914–18 and 1939–45, the navies of East and West Germany both were faced with the 
problems of adjusting to new strategic realities in which the divided Germany was a 
nuclear powder keg, as well as the subject of the two super powers, whose strategic ideas 
ranged far beyond the limits of central Europe. Nonetheless, both Germanys fitted into 
this Cold War system. This process also forced once more the political ethos of the navy 
to the forefront, a development that is more interesting when seen in hindsight than, say, 
in the 1950s or even 1960s. This process hinged on the selection of appropriate traditions 
and virtues from the past, and neither organization chose to identify with the precursor 
Kriegsmarine—at least in the beginning. For the Bundesmarine, extracting a usable past 
from a history that offered little of much use was a challenging task but a vital component 
of establishing tradition and a sense of professionalism among the naval cadre. 
Establishing the link between society and the military, and founding a naval service based 
on the fundamentals of the Basic Law, required the creation of a professional ethos. The 
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creators of the Bundeswehr developed the professional philosophy of innere führung to 
meet this task. This guidance for soldiers provided the West German military with a way 
of establishing command, obedience, and soldierly duty within a democracy. The concept 
of the “citizen in uniform,” together with innere führung, ensured that no military caste or 
“state within a state” would form again, and universal conscription gave every member of 
society a stake in the military and ensured a strong civil military relationship. The 
reconstruction of tradition and the cultivation of military professionalism in the post-war 
epoch were instrumental in healing Germany’s damaged civil military relations, and they 
laid the foundation for the socially integrated force manifest in the German Navy of 
today. 
The German Navy’s integration into alliance structures began during the Cold 
War, at a time when the navy’s operational control fell directly to NATO and German 
naval strategy was synonymous with NATO naval strategy. Since the fall of communism, 
however, the fleet has shifted from escort force to expeditionary force and has increased 
its scope beyond the national or NATO periphery. The transition has been marked by 
domestic uncertainty concerning the roles that the German military should play in 
countering global threats, but measures, such as the 1994 constitutional court ruling on 
“out of area” deployments, and the reform initiatives started in 2010, have been 
instrumental in modernizing the German Navy, while at the same time, garnering popular 
support for what would have at one time been considered military adventurism.  
As is to be expected with military reform, there has been a fair share of 
contentious issues. The German Navy, as a component of the Bundeswehr, has been 
downsizing its forces since unification. The recent suspension of conscription, which was 
aimed in a time of fiscal austerity at creating a more compact and professional force, has 
been an especially touchy subject. Conscription is a foundational aspect of the 
Bundeswehr and a component of the “citizen in uniform.” Just 10 years ago, the idea of a 
professional military in Germany was not realistic. Yet, to meet modern security 
demands, a compact and deployable force is required. The German Navy encountered 
trouble after unification as it took on expeditionary roles but was manned by a 
conscripted force that was only deployable on a voluntary basis. With the newly 
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professionalized manning, the navy is poised and ready to deploy where necessary in 
support of alliance collective security initiatives.  
In contemporary Germany, the recognition of a history marred by militarism and 
excessive nationalism largely explains Germany’s preference for seeking political rather 
than military solutions to problems through multilateral institutions. A certain skepticism 
still persists among the German public regarding out-of-area military adventures, and the 
domestic landscape does not support an expansion of the present-day German Navy on 
the scale of the United States, the United Kingdom, or France. Missions of the German 
Navy today run the gamut from conflict prevention and crisis management to 
peacekeeping and counter-terrorism. The new challenges of this changed security 
environment in the epoch since 1990 have demanded that Germany take on new strategic 
roles and push the bounds of its Basic Law, specifically the interpretation of Article 87a 
that states “The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence.”223 In 
the modern, globalized world, transnational threats emanating from non-state actors, such 
as terrorism and piracy have displaced the Cold War-era state-on-state ideological 
struggle. The nature of these threats dictates that the “purposes of defense” are no longer 
confined to the Federal Republic’s immediate borders or NATO’s periphery, but rather 
defense requires martial forces integrated into alliance security systems poised to react in 
a global theater. Given Germany’s history, it comes as no surprise that the public has a 
general skepticism of war and the potential for military excess. Yet one does ill to accept 
the misconception emanating from some corners of the political sphere that Germany’s 
connection with its past has resulted in pacifism or an unwillingness to pull its weight in 
the alliance security structures to which it is party. The Federal Republic has been a 
reliable partner, and its navy is in a continual process of transformation and reform to 
better poise itself to support multilateral European and trans-Atlantic alliance security 
systems. From two failed bids at world power to settling in as a strong alliance power, the 
German Navy as a servant to empires and republics has evolved into a strong and 
efficient institution built upon democratic ideals, premised on a strong civil military 
relationship, and supporting cohesive and responsible statecraft. 
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